Automating Efficient RAM-Model Secure Computation by Liu, Chang et al.
Automating Efficient RAM-Model Secure
Computation
Chang Liu Yan Huang Elaine Shi Jonathan Katz Michael Hicks
University of Maryland
College Park, Maryland 20742
Email: {liuchang, yhuang, elaine, jkatz, mwh}@cs.umd.edu
Abstract—RAM-model secure computation addresses the in-
herent limitations of circuit-model secure computation considered
in almost all previous work. Here, we describe the first automated
approach for RAM-model secure computation in the semi-
honest model. We define an intermediate representation called
SCVM and a corresponding type system suited for RAM-model
secure computation. Leveraging compile-time optimizations, our
approach achieves order-of-magnitude speedups compared to
both circuit-model secure computation and the state-of-art RAM-
model secure computation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure computation allows mutually distrusting parties to
make collaborative use of their local data without harming pri-
vacy of their individual inputs. Since Yao’s seminal paper [30],
research on secure two-party computation—especially in the
semi-honest model we consider here—has flourished, resulting
in ever more efficient protocols [4], [10], [15], [31] as well
as several practical implementations [6], [11]–[13], [16], [20].
Since the first system for general-purpose secure two-party
computation was built in 2004 [20], efficiency has improved
substantially [4], [13].
Almost all previous implementations of general-purpose
secure computation assume the underlying computation is
represented as a circuit. While theoretical developments using
circuits are sensible (and common), compiling typical pro-
grams, which assume a von Neumann-style Random Access
Machine (RAM) model, to efficient circuits can be challeng-
ing. One significant challenge is handling dynamic memory
accesses to an array in which the memory location being
read/written depends on secret inputs. A typical program-to-
circuit compiler typically makes an entire copy of the array
upon every dynamic memory access, thus resulting in a huge
circuit when the data size is large. Theoretically speaking,
generic approaches for translating RAM programs into circuits
incur, in general, O(TN) blowup in efficiency, where T is an
upper bound on the program’s running time, and N is the
memory size.
To address the above limitations, researchers have more re-
cently considered secure computation that works directly in the
RAM model [10], [19]. The key insight is to rely on Oblivious
RAM (ORAM) [8] to enable dynamic memory access with
poly-logarithmic cost, while preventing information leakage
through memory-access patterns. Gordon et al. [10] observed
a significant advantage of RAM-model secure computation
(RAM-SC) in the setting of repeated sublinear-time queries
(e.g., binary search) on a large database. By amortizing the
setup cost over many queries, RAM-SC can achieve amortized
cost asymptotically close to the run-time of the underlying
program in the insecure setting.
A. Our Contributions
We continue work on secure computation in the RAM
model, with the goal of providing a complete system that takes
a program written in a high-level language and compiles it to
a protocol for secure two-party computation of that program.1
In particular, we
• Define an intermediate representation (which we call
SCVM) suitable for efficient two-party RAM-model se-
cure computation;
• Develop a type system ensuring that any well-typed pro-
gram will generate a RAM-SC protocol secure in the
semi-honest model, if all subroutines are implemented
with a protocol secure in the semi-honest model.
• Build an automated compiler that transforms programs
written in a high-level language into a secure two-party
computation protocol, and integrate compile-time opti-
mizations crucial for improving performance.
We use our compiler to compile several programs includ-
ing Dijkstra’s shortest-path algorithm, KMP string matching,
binary search, and more. For moderate data sizes (up to the
order of a million elements), our evaluation shows a speedup
of 1–2 orders of magnitude as compared to standard circuit-
based approaches for securely computing these programs. We
expect the speedup to be even greater for larger data sizes.
B. Techniques
As explained in Sections II-A and III, the standard imple-
mentation of RAM-SC entails placing all data and instructions
inside a single Oblivious RAM. The secure evaluation of one
instruction then requires i) fetching instruction and data from
ORAM; and ii) securely executing the instruction using a
universal next-instruction circuit (similar to a machine’s ALU).
1Note that Gordon et al. [10] do not provide such a compiler; they only
implement RAM-model secure computation for the particular case of binary
search.
This approach is costly since each step must be done using a
secure-computation sub-protocol.
An efficient representation for RAM-SC. Our type system
and SCVM intermediate representation are capable of express-
ing RAM-SC tasks more efficiently by avoiding expensive
next-instruction circuits and minimizing ORAM operations
when there is no risk to security. These language-level capabil-
ities allow our compiler to apply compile-time optimizations
that would otherwise not be possible. Thus, we not only
obtain better efficiency than circuit-based approaches, but we
also achieve order-of-magnitude performance improvements in
comparison with straightforward implementations of RAM-SC
(see Section VI-C).
Program-trace simulatability. A well-typed program in our
language is guaranteed to be both instruction-trace oblivious
and memory-trace oblivious. Instruction-trace obliviousness
ensures that the values of the program counter during execution
of the protocol do not leak information about secret inputs
other than what is revealed by the output of the program.
As such, the parties can avoid securely evaluating a universal
next-instruction circuit, but can instead simply evaluate a
circuit corresponding to the current instruction. Memory-trace
obliviousness ensures that memory accesses observed by one
party during the protocol’s execution similarly do not leak
information about secret inputs other than what is revealed
by the output. In particular, if access to some array does not
depend on secret information (e.g., it is part of a linear scan
of the array), then the array need not be placed into ORAM.
We formally define the security property ensured by our
type system as program-trace simulatability. We define a
mechanism for compiling programs to protocols that rely on
certain ideal functionalities. We prove that if every such ideal
functionality is instantiated with a semi-honest secure protocol
computing that functionality, then any well-typed program
compiles to a semi-honest secure protocol computing that
program.
Additional language features. SCVM supports several other
useful features. First, it permits reactive computations by
allowing output not only at the end of the program’s execution,
but also while it is in progress. Our notation of program-trace
simulatability also fits this reactive model of computation.
SCVM also integrates state-of-the-art optimization tech-
niques that have been suggested previously in the literature.
For example, we support public, local, and secure modes
of computation, a technique recently explored (in the circuit
model) by Kerschbaum [15] and Rastogi et al. [24] Our
compiler can identify and encode portions of computation that
can be safely performed in the clear or locally by one of the
parties, without incurring the cost of a secure-computation sub-
protocol.
Our SCVM intermediate representation generalizes circuit-
model approaches. For programs that do not rely on ORAM,
our compiler effectively generates an efficient circuit-model
secure-computation protocol. This paper focuses on the design
of the intermediate representation language and type system for
RAM-model secure computation, as well as the compile-time
optimization techniques we apply. Our work is complementary
to several independent, ongoing efforts focused on improving
the cryptographic back end.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. RAM-Model Secure Computation
In this section, we review some background for RAM-
model secure computation. Our treatment is adapted from that
of Gordon et al. [10], with notation adjusted for our purposes.
We compare our scheme against the one presented here in
Section VI-C.
A key underlying building block of RAM-model secure
computation is Oblivious RAM (ORAM) which was initially
proposed by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [8] and later improved
in a sequence of works [9], [17], [26], [27], [29]. ORAM is
a cryptographic primitive that hides memory-access patterns
by randomly reshuffling data in memory. With ORAM, each
memory read or write operation incurs poly log n actual mem-
ory accesses.
We introduce some notation to describe the execution of a
RAM program. We let mem refer to the memory maintained
by the program. We let (pc, raddr, waddr, wdata, reg) ←
U(I, reg, rdata) denote a single application of the next-
instruction circuit (like a CPU’s ALU), taking as input the
current instruction I, the current register contents reg, and a
value rdata (representing a value just fetched from memory),
and outputting the next value of the program counter pc, an
updated register file reg, a read address raddr, a write address
waddr, and a value wdata to write to location mem[waddr].
mem[i] the memory value at index i
pc the current program counter
reg an O(1)-sized set of registers
I an instruction
U the next-instruction circuit
rdata the last value read from memory
wdata the value to write to memory
raddr a read address
waddr a write address
Existing RAM-model secure computation proceeds as in
Figure 1. The entire memory denoted mem, containing both
program instructions and data, is placed in ORAM, and the
ORAM is secret-shared between the two participating parties
as discussed above, e.g., using a simple XOR-based secret-
sharing scheme. With ORAM, a memory access thus requires
each party to access the elements of their respective arrays
at pseudorandom locations (the addresses are dictated by the
ORAM algorithm), and the value stored at each position is then
obtained by XORing the values read by each of the parties.
Alternatively, the server can hold an encryption of the ORAM
array, and the client holds the key. The latter was done by
Gordon et al. to ensure that one party holds only O(1) state.
All CPU states, including pc, reg, I, rdata, wdata, raddr,
and waddr, are also secret-shared between the two parties.
In Figure 1, each step of the computation must be done
using some secure computation subprotocol. In particular, SC-
U is a secure computation protocol that securely evaluates
the universal next instruction circuit, and SC-ORAM is a
secure computation protocol that securely evaluates the ORAM
/* All variables, including mem, pc, I, rdata, reg, wdata, raddr, and waddr are secret-shared between the two parties. */
For i = 1, 2, . . . , t where t is the maximum run-time of the program:
instr. fetch phase: I ← ORAM.Read(mem, pc) //Protocol SC-ORAM
CPU phase: (pc, raddr, waddr, wdata, reg) ← U (I, reg, rdata) //Protocol SC-U
data read phase: rdata ← ORAM.Read(mem, raddr) //Protocol SC-ORAM
data write phase: ORAM.Write(mem, waddr, wdata) //Protocol SC-ORAM
Fig. 1: Generic RAM-model secure computation. The parties repeatedly perform secure computation to obtain the next
instruction I , execute that instruction, and then read/write from/to main memory. All data are secret-shared.
Scenario Potential benefits of RAM-model secure computation
1 Repeated sublinear queries over a large dataset (e.g.,
binary search, range query, shortest path query)
• Amortize preprocessing cost over multiple queries
• Achieve sublinear amortized cost per query
2 One-time computation over a large dataset Avoid paying O(n) cost per dynamic memory access
TABLE I: Two main scenarios and advantages of RAM-model secure computation
algorithm. For ORAM.Read, each party supplies a secret share
of the raddr, and during the course of the protocol, the
ORAM.Read protocol will emit obfuscated addresses for each
party to read from. At the end of the protocol, each party
obtains a share of the fetched data. For ORAM.Write, each
party supplies a secret share of waddr and wdata, and during
the course of the protocol, the ORAM.Read protocol will emit
obfuscated addresses for each party to write to, and secret
shares of values to write to those addresses.
Scenarios for RAM-model secure computation. While Gor-
don et al. describe RAM-model secure computation mainly for
the amortized setting, where repeated computations are carried
out starting from a single initial dataset, we note that RAM-
model secure computation can also be meaningful for one-time
computation on large datasets, since a straightforward RAM-
to-circuit compiler would incur linear (in the size of dataset)
overhead for every dynamic memory access whose address
depends on sensitive inputs. Table I summarizes the two main
scenarios for RAM-model secure computation, and potential
advantages of using the RAM model in these cases.
B. Other Related Work
Automating and optimizing circuit-model secure computa-
tion. As mentioned earlier, a number of recent efforts have
focused on automating and optimizing secure computation
in the circuit model. Intermediate representations for secure
computation have been developed in the circuit model, e.g.,
[16]. Mardziel et al. [21] proposed a way to reason about the
amount of information declassified by the result of a secure
computation, and Rastogi et al. [24] used a similar analysis to
infer intermediate values that can be safely declassified without
revealing further information beyond what is also revealed by
the output. These analyses can be applied to our setting as well
(though their results would not necessarily be accepted by our
type system, whose improved precision would be future work).
Concurrently with our work, Rastogi et al. [23] developed
Wysteria, a programming language for mixed mode secure
multiparty computations, which consist of local computations
intermixed with joint, secure ones. While this high-level idea is
similar to our work, the details are very different. For example,
they do not provide a simulatability theorem (they propose to
accept results from the analysis of Rastogi et al. [24] ) and are
focused more at usability.
Zahur and Evans [31] also attempted to address some
of the drawbacks of circuit-model secure computation. Their
approach, however, focuses on designing efficient circuit struc-
tures for specific data structures, such as stacks and queues,
and do not generalize for arbitrary programs. Many of the
programs we use in our experiments are not supported by their
approach.
Trace-oblivious type systems. Our type system is trace-
oblivious. Liu et al. [18] propose a memory-trace oblivious
type system for a secure-processor application. In compar-
ison, our program trace also includes instructions. Further,
Liu et al. propose an indistinguishability-based trace-oblivious
notion which is equivalent to a simulation-based notion in
their setting. In the secure computation setting, however, an
indistinguishability-based trace-oblivious notion is not equiv-
alent to simulation-based trace obliviousness due to the de-
classification of computation outputs. We therefore define a
simulation-based trace-oblivious notion in our paper which is
necessary to ensure the security of the compiled two-party
protocol. Other work has proposed type systems that track side
channels as traces. For example, Agat’s work traces operations
in order to avoid timing leaks [1].
III. TECHNICAL OVERVIEW: COMPILING FOR
RAM-MODEL SECURE COMPUTATION
This section describes our approach to optimize RAM-
model secure computation. Our key idea is use static anal-
ysis during compilation to minimize the use of heavyweight
cryptographic primitives such as garbled circuits and ORAM.
A. Instruction-Trace Obliviousness
The standard RAM-model secure computation protocol
described in Section II-A is relatively inefficient because it
requires a secure-computation sub-protocol to compute the
universal next-instruction circuit U . This circuit has large
size, since it must interpret every possible instruction. In our
solution, we will avoid relying on a universal next-instruction
circuit, and will instead arrange things so that we can securely
evaluate instruction-specific circuits.
Note that it is not secure, in general, to reveal what
instruction is being carried out at each step in the execution of
some program. As a simple example, consider a branch over
a secret value s:
if(s) x[i]:=a+b; else x[i]:=a-b
Depending on the value of s, a different instruction (i.e.,
add or subtract) will be executed. To mitigate such an
implicit information leak, our compiler transforms a program
to an instruction-trace oblivious counterpart, i.e., a program
whose program-counter value (which determines which in-
struction will be executed next) does not depend on secret
information. The key idea there is to use a mux operation to
rewrite a secret if-statement. For example, the above code can




t4 := mux(t1, t2, t3);
x[i] := t4
At every point during the above computation, the instruc-
tion being executed is pre-determined, and so does not leak in-
formation about sensitive data. Instruction-trace obliviousness
is similar to program-counter security proposed by Molnar et
al. [22] (for a different application).
B. Memory-Trace Obliviousness
Using ORAM for memory accesses is also a heavyweight
operation in RAM-model secure computation. The standard
approach is to place all memory in a single ORAM, thus
incurring O(poly log n) cost per data operation, where n is
a bound on the size of the memory.
In the context of securing remote execution against physical
attacks, Liu et al. [18] recently observe that not all access
patterns of a program are sensitive. For example, a findmax
program that sequentially scans through an array to find
the maximum element has predictable access patterns that
do not depend on sensitive inputs. We propose to apply a
similar idea to the context of RAM-model secure computation.
Our compiler performs static analysis to detect safe memory
accesses that do not depend on secret inputs. In this way, we
can avoid using ORAM when the access pattern is independent
of sensitive inputs. It is also possible to store various subsets
of memory (e.g., different arrays) in different ORAMs, when
information about which portion of memory (e.g., which array)
is being accessed does not depend on sensitive information.
C. Mixed-Mode Execution
We also use static analysis to partition a program into code
blocks, and then for each code block use either a public, local,
or secure mode of execution (described next). Computation in
public or local modes avoids heavyweight secure computation.
In the intermediate language, each statement is labeled with
its mode of execution.
Public mode. Statements computing on publicly-known vari-
ables or variables that have been declassified in the middle
of program execution can be performed by both parties inde-
pendently, without having to resort to a secure-computation
protocol. Such statements are labeled P. For example, the
loop iterators (in lines 1, 3, 10) in Dijkstra’s algorithm (see
Figure 2) do not depend on secret data, and so each party can
independently compute them.
Local mode. For statements computing over Alice’s variables,
public variables, or previously declassified variables, Alice
can perform the computation independently without interacting
with Bob (and vice versa). Here we crucially rely on the fact
that we assume semi-honest behavior. Alice-local statements
are labeled A, and Bob-local statements are labeled B.
Secure mode. All other statements that depend on variables
that must be kept secret from both Alice and Bob will be
computed using secure computation, making ORAM accesses
along the way if necessary. Such statements are labeled O (for
“oblivious”).
D. Example: Dijkstra’s Algorithm
In Figure 2, we present a complete compilation example for
part of Dijkstra’s algorithm. Here one party, Alice, has a private
graph represented by a pairwise edge-weight array e[][] and
the other party, Bob, has a private source/destination pair. Bob
wishes to compute the shortest path between his source and
destination in Alice’s graph. The figure shows the code that
computes shortest paths (Bob’s inputs are elided).
Our specific implementation of Dijkstra’s algorithm uses
three arrays, a dis array which keeps track of the current
shortest distance from the source to any other node; an edge-
weight array orame which is initialized by Alice’s local array
e, and an indicator array vis, denoting whether each node has
been visited. In this case, our compiler places arrays vis and
e in separate ORAMs, but does not place array dis in ORAM
since access to dis always follows a sequential pattern.
Note that parts of the algorithm can be computed publicly.
For example, all the loop iterators are public values; therefore,
loop iterators need not be secret-shared, and each party can
independently compute the current loop iteration. The remain-
ing parts of program all require ORAM accesses; therefore,
our compiler annotates these instructions to be run in secure
mode, and generates equivalent instruction- and memory-trace
oblivious target code.
IV. SCVM LANGUAGE
This section presents SCVM, our language for RAM-model
secure computation, and presents our formal results.
In Section IV-A, we present SCVM’s formal syntax. In
Section IV-B, we give a formal, ideal world semantics for
SCVM that forms the basis of our security theorem. Informally,
each party provides their inputs to an ideal functionality F
1 for(i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
2 int bestj = -1; bestdis = -1;
3 for(int j=0; j<n; ++j) {
4 if( ! vis[j] && (bestj < 0
5 || dis[j] < bestdis))
6 bestj = j;
7 bestdis = dis[j];
8 }
9 vis[bestj] = 1;
10 for(int j=0; j<n; ++j) {
11 if( !vis[j] && (bestdis +
12 e[bestj][j] < dis[j]))
13 dis[j] = bestdis + e[bestj][j];
14 }
15 }
O: orame :=oram( e );
P: i :=0; P: cond1 := i < n ;
P:while( cond1 ) do
O:bestj:=-1; O:bestdis:=-1;
P: j :=0; P: cond2 := j < n ;
P:while( cond2 ) do
O:t1:= vis [ j ]; O:t2:=!t1; O:t3:=best<0;
O:t4:= dis [ j ]; O:t5:=t4<bestdis;
O:t6:=t3||t5; O:cond3:=t2 && t6;
O:best :=mux(cond3, j , best);
O:bestdis:=mux(cond3, t4, bestdis);
P: j := j +1; P: cond2 := j < n ;;
O: vis [ bestj ]:=1;
P: j :=0; P: cond2 := j < n ;
P:while(cond2) do
O:t7:= vis [ j ]; O:t8:=!t7;
O:idx:=bestj*n; O:idx:=idx+ j ; O:t9:= orame [idx];
O:t10:=bestdis + t9; O:t11:= dis [ j ];
O:t12:=t10 < t11; O:cond4:=t8 && t12
O:t13:=mux(cond4, t10, t11); O: dis [ j ]:=t13;
P: j := j +1; P: cond2 := j < n ;
Fig. 2: Compilation example: Part of Dijkstra’s shortest-path algorithm. The code on the left is compiled to the annotated code
on the right. Array variable e is Alice’s local input array containing the graph’s edge weights; Bob’s input, a source/destination
pair, is not used in this part of the algorithm. Array variables vis and orame are placed in ORAMs. Array variable dis
is placed in non-oblivious (but secret-shared) memory. (Prior to the shown code, vis is initialized to all zeroes except that
vis[source]—where source is Bob’s input—is initialized to 1, and dis[i] is initialized to e[source][i].) Variables n ,
i , j and others boxed in white background are public variables. All other variables are secret-shared between the two parties.
that computes the result and returns to each party its result
and a trace of events it is allowed to see; these events
include instruction fetches, memory accesses, and declassifi-
cation events, which are results computed from both parties’
data. Section IV-C formally defines our security property, Γ-
simulatability. Informally, a program is secure if each party,
starting with its own inputs, memory, the program code, and
its trace of declassification events, can simulate (in polynomial
time) its observed instruction traces and memory traces without
knowing the other party’s data. We present a type system
for SCVM programs in Section IV-D, and in Theorem 1
prove that well-typed programs are Γ-simulatable. Theorem 2
additionally shows that well-typed programs will not get stuck,
e.g., because one party tries to access memory unavailable
to it. Finally, in Section IV-E we define a hybrid world
functionality that more closely models SCVM’s implemented
semantics using ORAM, garbled circuits, etc. and prove that
for Γ-simulatable programs, the hybrid-world protocol securely
implements the ideal functionality. The formal results are
summarized in Figure 3.
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Fig. 3: Formal results.
A. Syntax
The syntax of SCVM is given in Figure 4. In SCVM, each
variable and statement has a security label from the lattice
{P,A,B,O}, where v is defined to be the smallest partial order
such that P v l v O for l ∈ {A, B}. The label of each variable
indicates whether its memory location should be public, known
to either Alice or Bob (only), or secret. For readability, we
do not distinguish between oblivious secret arrays and non-
oblivious secret arrays at this point, and simply assume that
all secret arrays are oblivious. Support for non-oblivious, secret
arrays will be added in Section V.
Variables x, y, z ∈ Vars
Security Labels l ∈ SecLabels = {P, A, B, O}
Numbers n ∈ Nat
Operation op ::= + | − | ...
Expressions e ::= x | n | x op x |
x[x] | mux(x, x, x)
Statements s ::= skip | x := e | x[x] := x |
if (x) then S else S |
while (x) do S |
x := declassl(y) |
x := oram(y)
Labeled Statements S ::= l : s | S;S
Fig. 4: Syntax of SCVM
An information-flow control type system, which we discuss
in Section IV-D, enforces that information can only flow from
low (i.e., lower in the partial order) security variables to high
security variables. For example, for a statement x := y to be
secure, y’s security label should be less than or equal to x’s
security label. An exception is the declassification statement
x := declassl(y) which may declassify a variable y labeled O
to a variable x with lower security label l.
The label of each statement indicates the statement’s mode
of execution. A statement with the label P is executed in public
mode, where both Alice and Bob can see its execution. A
statement with the label A or B is executed in local mode, and
is visible to only Alice or Bob, respectively. A statement with
the label O is executed securely, so both Alice and Bob know
the statement was executed but do not learn the underlying
values that were used.
Most SCVM language features are standard. We highlight
the statement x := oram(y), by which variable x is assigned
to an ORAM initialized with array y’s contents, and the
expression mux(x0, x1, x2), which evaluates to either x1 or
x2, depending on whether x0 is 0 or 1.
B. Semantics
We define a formal semantics for SCVM programs which
we think of as defining a computation carried out, on Alice and
Bob’s behalf, by an ideal functionality F . However, as we fore-
shadow throughout, the semantics is endowed with sufficient
structure that it can be interpreted as using the mechanisms
(like ORAM and garbled circuits) described in Sections II
and III. We discuss such a hybrid world interpretation more
carefully in Section IV-E and prove it also satisfies our security
properties.
Memories and types. Before we begin, we consider a few
auxiliary definitions given in Figure 5. A memory M is a
partial map from variables to value-label pairs. The value is
either a natural number n or an array m, which is a partial map
from naturals to naturals. The security labels l ∈ {P,A,B,O}
indicate the conceptual visibility of the value as described
earlier. Note that in a real-world implementation, data labeled
O is stored in ORAM and secret-shared between Alice and
Bob, while other data is stored locally by Alice or Bob. We
sometimes find it convenient to project memories whose values
are visible at particular labels:
Definition 1 (L-projection). Given memory M and a set of
security labels L, we write M [L] as M ’s L-projection, which
is itself a memory such that for all x, M [L](x) = (v, l) if and
only if M(x) = (v, l) and l ∈ L.
We define types Nat l and Array l, for numbers and arrays,
respectively, where l is a security label. A type environment Γ
associates variables with types, and we interpret it as a partial
map. We sometimes consider when a memory is consistent
with a type environment Γ:
Definition 2 (Γ-compatibility). We say a memory M is Γ-
compatible if and only if for all x, when M(x) = (v, l), then
v ∈ Nat⇔ Γ(x) = Nat l and v ∈ Array⇔ Γ(x) = Array l.
Ideal functionality. Once Alice and Bob have agreed on a pro-
gram S, we imagine an ideal functionality F that executes S.
Alice and Bob send to F memories MA and MB , respectively.
Alice’s memory contains data labeled A and P, while Bob’s
memory contains data labeled B and P. (Data labeled O is only
constructed during execution.) F then proceeds as follows:
1) It checks that MA and MB agree on P-labeled values,
i.e., that MA[{P}] = MB [{P}]. It also checks that they
do not share any A/B-labeled values, i.e., that the domain
of MA[{A}] and the domain of MB [{B}] do not intersect.
If either of these conditions fail, F notifies both parties
and aborts the execution. Otherwise, it constructs memory
M from MA and MB :
M = {x 7→ (v, l) | MA[{A,P}](x) = (v, l) ∨
MB [{B}](x) = (v, l)}
2) F executes S according to semantics rules having the
form 〈M,S〉 (ia,ta,ib,tb)−−−−−−−→ 〈M ′, S′〉 : D. This judgment
states that starting in memory M , statement S runs,
producing a new memory M ′ and a new statement S′
(representing the partially executed program) along with
instruction traces ia and ib, memory traces ta and tb, and
declassification event D. We discuss these traces/events
shortly. The ideal execution will produce one of three
outcomes (or fail to terminate):
• 〈M,S〉 (ia,ta,ib,tb)−−−−−−−→ 〈M ′, S′〉 : D, where D = (da, db).
In this case, F outputs da to Alice, and db to Bob. Then
F sets M to M ′ and S to S′ and restarts step 2.
• 〈M,S〉 (ia,ta,ib,tb)−−−−−−−→ 〈M ′, l : skip〉 : ε. In this case, F
notifies both parties that computation finished success-
fully.
• 〈M,S〉 (ia,ta,ib,tb)−−−−−−−→ 〈M ′, S′〉 : ε, where S′ 6= l : skip,
and no rules further reduce 〈M ′, S′〉. In this case, F
aborts and notifies both parties.
Notice that the only communications between F and each
party about the computation are declassifications da and db (to
Alice and Bob, respectively) and notification of termination.
This is because we assume that secure programs will always
explicitly declassify their final output (and perhaps interme-
diate outputs, e.g., when processing multiple queries), while
Arrays m ∈ Array = Nat ⇀ Nat
Memory M ∈ Vars ⇀ (Array ∪ Nat)× SecLabels
Type τ ::= Nat l | Array l
Type Environment Γ ::= x : τ | ·
Instruction Traces i ::= l : x := e | l : x[x] := x |
l : declass(x, y) | l : init(x, y)
l : if(x) | l : while(x) | i@i | ε
Memory Traces t ::= read(x, n) | readarr(x, n, n) |
write(x, n) | writearr(x, n, n) |
x | t@t | ε
Declassification d ::= (x, n) | ε
Declass. event D ::= (d, d) | ε
select(l, t1, t2) =

(t1, t1) if l = P
(t1, ε) if l = A
(ε, t1) if l = B
(t2, t2) if l = O
inst(l, i) = select(l, l : i, l : i)
get(m, i) =
{
m(i) 0 ≤ i < |m|
0 otherwise
set(m, i, v) =
{
m[i 7→ v] 0 ≤ i < |m|
m otherwise
arr(x,m) = readarr(x, 0,m(0))@...@readarr(x, n,m(n))
where n = |m| − 1
t1 ≡ t2 t ≡ t t@ε ≡ ε@t ≡ t
t1 ≡ t′1 t2 ≡ t′2
t1@t2 ≡ t′1@t′2
Fig. 5: Auxiliary syntax and functions for semantics
all other variables in memory are not of consequence. The
memory and instruction traces, though not explicitly communi-
cated by F , will be visible in a real implementation (described
later), but we prove that they provide no additional information
beyond that provided by the declassification events.
Traces and events. The formal semantics incorporate the
concept of traces to define information leakage. There are
three types of traces, all given in Figure 5. The first is
an instruction trace i. The instruction trace generated by an
assignment statement is the statement itself (e.g., x := e); the
instruction trace generated by a branching statement is denoted
if(x) or while(x). Declassification and ORAM initialization
will generate instruction traces declass(x, y) and init(x, y),
respectively. The trace ε indicates an unobservable statement
execution (e.g., Bob cannot observe Alice executing her local
code). Trace equivalence (i.e. t1 ≡ t2) is defined in Figure 5.
The second sort of trace is a memory trace t, which
captures reads or writes of variables visible to one or the other
party. Here are the different memory trace events:
• P: Operations on public arrays generate memory event
readarr(x, n, v) or writearr(x, n, v) visible to both par-
ties, including the variable name x, the index n, and the
value v read or written. Operations on public variables
generate memory event read(x, v) or write(x, v). To
initialize an ORAM from a public array will access each
item in the array, so a sequence of readarr(x, i,m(i))
for i = 0, ..., |m| − 1, is visible to both Alice and Bob.
We use arr(x,m) to indicate such a sequence of memory
events.
• A/B: Operations on Alice’s secret arrays generate memory
event readarr(x, n, v) or writearr(x, n, v) visible to Al-
ice only. Operations on Alice’s secret variables generate
memory event read(x, v) or write(x, v) visible to Alice
only. Initializing an ORAM from Alice’s secret array
generate memory events arr(x,m) visible to Alice only.
Operations on Bob’s secret arrays/variables are handled
similarly.
• O: Operations on a secret array generate memory event x
visible to both Alice and Bob, containing only the variable
name, but not the index or the value. A special case is the
initialization of ORAM bank x with y’s value: a memory
trace y, but not its content, is observed.
Memory-trace equivalence is defined similarly to instruction-
trace equivalence.
Finally, each declassification executed by the program pro-
duces a declassification event (da, db), where Alice learns the
declassification da and Bob learns db. There is also an empty
declassification event ε, which is used for non-declassification
statements. Given a declassification event D = (da, db), we
write D[A] to denote Alice’s declassification da and D[B] to
denote Bob’s declassification db.
Semantics rules. Now we turn to the semantics, which consists
of two judgments. Figure 6 defines rules for the judgment
l ` 〈M, e〉 ⇓(ta,tb) v, which states that in mode l, under
memory M , expression e evaluates to v. This evaluation
produces memory trace ta (resp., tb) for Alice (resp., Bob).
Which memory trace event to emit is chosen using the function
select, which is defined in Figure 5. The security label l
is passed in by the corresponding assignment statement (i.e.
l : x := e or l : y[x1] := x2). If l is A or B, then the accesses to
public variables are not observable to the other party, whereas
if l is O then both parties know that an access took place;
the l? label defined in E-Var and E-Array ensures the proper
visibility of such events. Note the E-Array rule uses the get()
function to retrieve an element from an array; this function
will return a default value 0 if the index is out of bounds.
Most elements of the rules are otherwise straightforward.
Figure 7 defines rules for the judgment 〈M,S〉 (ia,ta,ib,tb)−−−−−−−→
〈M ′, S′〉 : D, which says that under memory M , the statement
S reduces to memory M ′ and statement S′, while producing
instruction trace ia (resp., ib) and memory trace ta (resp., tb)
for Alice (resp., Bob), and generating declassification D. Most
rules are standard, except for handling memory traces and
instruction traces. Instruction traces are handled using function
inst defined in Figure 5. This function is defined such that
if the label l of a statement is A or B, then the other party
cannot observe the statement; otherwise, both parties observe
the statement.
A skip statement generates empty instruction traces and
memory traces for both parties regardless of its label. An
assignment statement first evaluates the expression to assign,
E-Const l ` 〈M,n〉 ⇓(ε,ε) n
E-Var
M(x) = (v, l′) v ∈ Nat l′ v l
l = O⇒ l? = l′ l 6= O⇒ l? = l
(ta, tb) = select(l
?, read(x, v), x)
l ` 〈M,x〉 ⇓(ta,tb) v
E-Array
M(x) = (m, l′) m ∈ Array l′ v l
l = O⇒ l? = l′ l 6= O⇒ l? = l
l ` 〈M,y〉 ⇓(t′a,t′b) v v
′ = get(m, v)
(t′′a , t
′′
b ) = select(l










l ` 〈M,x[y]〉 ⇓(ta,tb) v
′
E-Op
l ` 〈M,xi〉 ⇓(tia,tib) vi i = 1, 2
v = v1 op v2
ta = t1a@t2a tb = t1b@t2b
l ` 〈M,x1 op x2〉 ⇓(ta,tb) v
E-Mux
l ` 〈M,xi) ⇓(tia,tib) vi i = 1, 2, 3
v1 = 0⇒ v = v2 v1 6= 0⇒ v = v3
ta = t1a@t2a@t3a tb = t1b@t2b@t3b
l ` 〈M,mux(x1, x2, x3)〉 ⇓(ta,tb) v
Fig. 6: Operational semantics for expressions in SCVM l ` 〈M, e〉 ⇓(ta,tb) v
and its trace and the write event constitute the memory trace
for this statement. Note that expression is evaluated using the
label l of the assignment statement as per the discussion of
E-Var and E-Array above.
Declassification x := declassl(y) declassifies a secret
variable y (labeled O) to a non-secret variable x (not labeled O).
Both Alice and Bob will observe that y is accessed (as defined
by ta and tb), whereas the label l of variable x determines who
sees the declassified value as indicated by the declassification
event D.
ORAM initialization produces a shared, secret array x from
an array y provided by one party. Thus, the security label of
x must be O, and the security label of y must not be O. This
rule implies that the party who holds y will observe memory
events arr(y,m), and then both parties can observe accesses
to x.
Rule S-ArrAss handles an array assignment. Similar to
rule E-Array, out-of-bounds indices are ignored (cf. the set()
function in Figure 5). For if-statements and while-statements,
no memory traces are observed other than those observed from
evaluating the guard x.
Rule S-Seq sequences execution of two statements
in the obvious way. Finally, rule S-Concat says that if
〈M,S〉 (ia,ta,ib,tb)−−−−−−−→ 〈M ′′, S′′〉 : D, the transformation may
perform one or more small-step transformations that generate
no declassification.
C. Security
The ideal functionality F defines the baseline of security,
emulating a trusted third party that runs the program using
Alice and Bob’s data, directly revealing to them only the
explicitly declassified values. In a real implementation run
directly by Alice and Bob, however, each party will see
additional events of interest, in particular an instruction trace
and a memory trace (as defined by the semantics). Importantly,
we want to show that these traces provide no additional
information about the opposite party’s data beyond what each
party could learn from observing F . We do this by proving that
in fact these traces can be simulated by Alice and Bob using
their local data and the list of declassification events provided
by F . As such, revealing the instruction and memory traces
(as in a real implementation) provides no additional useful
information.
We call our security property Γ-simulatability. To state this
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〈M ′, P ′〉 : D1, ..., Dn, D′
This allows programs to make multiple declassifications, ac-
cumulating them as a trace, while remembering only the
most recent instruction and memory traces and ensuring that
intermediate memories are Γ-compatible.
Definition 3 (Γ-simulatability). Let Γ be a type environment,
and P a program. We say P is Γ-simulatable if there exist
simulators simA and simB , which run polynomial time in the
data size, such that for all M, ia, ta, ib, tb,M ′, P ′, D1, ..., Dn,
if 〈M,P 〉 Γ,(ia,ta,ib,tb)−−−−−−−−−→
?
〈M ′, P ′〉 : D1, ..., Dn, then
simA(M [{P,A}], D1[A], ..., Dn−1[A]) ≡ (ia, ta) and
simB(M [{P,B}], D1[B], ..., Dn−1[B]) ≡ (ib, tb).
Intuitively, if P is Γ-simulatable there exists a simulator
simA that, given public data M [{P}], Alice’s secret data
M [{A}], and all outputs D1[A], ..., Dn−1[A] declassified to
Alice so far, can compute the instruction traces ia and memory
traces ta produced by the ideal semantics up until the next
declassification event Dn, regardless of the values of Bob’s
secret data.
Note that Γ-simulatability is termination insensitive, and
information may be leaked based upon whether a program
terminates or not [3]. However, as long as all runs of a program
are guaranteed to terminate (as is typical for programs run in
secure-computation scenarios), no information leakage occurs.
S-Skip 〈M, l : skip;S〉 (ε,ε,ε,ε)−−−−−→ 〈M,S〉 : ε
S-Assign
l ` 〈M, e〉 ⇓(t′a,t′b) v
M ′ = M [x 7→ (v, l)] (ia, ib) = inst(l, x := e)
(t′′a , t
′′










〈M, l : x := e〉 (ia,ta,ib,tb)−−−−−−−−→ 〈M ′, l : skip〉 : ε
S-Declass
M(y) = (v, O) l 6= O ta = tb = y
M ′ = M [x 7→ (v, l)] i = O : declass(x, y)
D = select(l, (x, v), ε)
〈M, O : x := declassl(y)〉
(i,ta,i,tb)−−−−−−→ 〈M ′, O : skip〉 : D
S-Cond
(ia, ib) = inst(l, if(x)) M(x) = (v, l)
(ta, tb) = select(l, read(x, v), x)
v = 1⇒ c = 1 v 6= 1⇒ c = 2
〈M, l : if(x)then S1else S2〉
(ia,ta,ib,tb)−−−−−−−−→ 〈M,Sc〉 : ε
S-ORAM
M(y) = (m, l) l 6= O
M ′ = M [x 7→ (m, O)] (t′a, t′b) = select(l, arr(y,m), ε)
i = O : init(x, y) ta = t′a@x tb = t′b@x
〈M, O : x := oram(y)〉 (i,ta,i,tb)−−−−−−→ 〈M ′, O : skip〉 : ε
S-ArrAss
M(y) = (m, l) l ` 〈M,xi〉 ⇓(tia,tib) vi i = 1, 2
m′ = set(m, v1, v2) M
′ = M [y 7→ (m′, l)]
(t′a, t
′
b) = select(l,writearr(y, v1, v2), y)
ta = t1a@t2a@t
′
a tb = t1b@t2b@t
′
b
(ia, ib) = inst(l, y[x1] := x2)
〈M, l : y[x1] := x2〉
(ia,ta,ib,tb)−−−−−−−−→ 〈M ′, l : skip〉 : ε
S-While-False
M(x) = (0, l) (ia, ib) = inst(l,while(x))
(ta, tb) = select(l, read(x, 0), x)
S = l : while(x)do S′
〈M,S〉 (ia,ta,ib,tb)−−−−−−−−→ 〈M, l : skip〉 : ε
S-While-True
M(x) = (v, l) v 6= 0
(ta, tb) = select(l, read(x, v), x)
S = l : while(x)do S′
〈M,S〉 (ia,ta,ib,tb)−−−−−−−−→ 〈M,S′;S〉 : ε
S-Seq
〈M,S1〉
(ia,ta,ib,ib)−−−−−−−−→ 〈M ′, S′1〉 : D
〈M,S1;S2〉
(ia,ta,ib,tb)−−−−−−−−→ 〈M ′, S′1;S2〉 : D
S-Concat


















b)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ 〈M ′′, S′〉 : D
Fig. 7: Operational semantics for statements in SCVM 〈M,S〉 (ia,ta,ib,tb)−−−−−−−→ 〈M ′, S′〉 : D
D. Type System
This section presents our type system, which we prove en-
sures Γ-simulatability. There are two judgments, both defined
in Figure 8. The first, written Γ ` e : τ , states that under
environment Γ, expression e evaluates to type τ . The second
judgment, written Γ, pc ` S, states that under environment Γ
and a label context pc, a labeled statement S is type-correct.
Here, pc is a label that describes the ambient control context;
pc is set according to the guards of enclosing conditionals or
loops. Note that since a program cannot execute an if-statement
or a while-statement whose guard is secret, pc can be one of
P, A, or B, but not O. Intuitively, if pc is A (resp., B), then
the statement is part of Alice’s (resp., Bob’s) local code. In
general, for a labeled statement S = l : s we enforce the
invariant pc v l, and if pc 6= P, then pc = l. In so doing, we
ensure that if the security label of a statement is A (including
if-statements and while-statements), then all nested statements
also have security label A, thus ensuring they are only visible to
Alice. On the other hand, under a public context, the statement
label is unrestricted.
Now we consider some interesting aspects of the rules.
Rule T-Assign requires pc t l′ v l, as is standard: pc v l
prevents implicit flows, and l′ v l prevents explicit ones. We
further restrict that Γ(x) = Nat l, i.e., the assigned variable
should have the same security label as the instruction label.
Rule T-ArrAss and rule T-Array require that for an array
expression y[x], the security label of x should be lower than
the security label of y. For example, if x is Alice’s secret
variable, then y should be either Alice’s local array, or an
ORAM shared between Alice and Bob. If y is Bob’s secret
variable, or a public variable, then Bob can observe which
indices are accessed, and then infer the value of x. In the
example from Figure 2, the array access vis[bestj] on line
9 requires that vis be an ORAM variable since bestj is.
For rules T-Declass and T-ORAM, since declassification
and ORAM initialization statements both require secure com-
putation, we restrict the statement label to be O. Since these
two statements cannot be executed in Alice’s or Bob’s local
mode, we restrict that pc = P.
Rule T-Cond deals with if-statements; T-While handles
while loops similarly. First of all, we restrict pc v l and
Γ(x) = Nat l for the same reason as above. Further,
the rule forbids l to be equal to O to avoid an implicit
flow revealed by the program’s control flow. An alternative
way to achieve instruction- and memory- trace oblivious-
ness is through padding [18]. However, in the setting of
secure-computation, padding achieves the same performance
as rewriting a secret-branching statement into a mux (or a se-
quence of them). And, using padding would require reasoning
about trace patterns, a complication our type system avoids.
A well-typed program is Γ-simulatable:
Theorem 1. If Γ, P ` S, then S is Γ-simulatable.
Γ ` e : τ T-Var
Γ(x) = Nat l
Γ ` x : Nat l
T-Const
Γ ` n : Nat P
T-Op
Γ(x1) = Nat l1 Γ(x2) = Nat l2
Γ ` x1 op x2 : Nat l1 t l2
T-Array
Γ(y) = Array l1
Γ(x) = Nat l2 l2 v l1
Γ ` y[x] : Nat l1
T-Mux
Γ(xi) = Nat li i = 1, 2, 3
l = l1 t l2 t l3
Γ ` mux(x1, x2, x3) : Nat l
Γ, pc ` S T-Skip
pc v l
pc 6= P⇒ pc = l
Γ, pc ` l : skip
T-Assign
Γ(x) = Nat l Γ ` e : Nat l′
pc t l′ v l pc 6= P⇒ l = pc
Γ, pc ` l : x := e
T-Declass
pc = P Γ(y) = Nat O
Γ(x) = Nat l l 6= O
Γ, pc ` O : x := declassl(y)
T-ORAM
pc = P Γ(x) = Array O
Γ(y) = Array l l 6= O
Γ, pc ` O : x := oram(y)
T-ArrAss
Γ(y) = Array l Γ(x1) = Nat l1
Γ(x2) = Nat l2 pc t l1 t l2 v l
pc 6= P⇒ l = pc
Γ, pc ` l : y[x1] := x2
T-Cond
Γ(x) = Nat l pc v l l 6= O
pc 6= P⇒ l = pc Γ, l ` Si i = 1, 2
Γ, pc ` l : if(x)then S1else S2
T-While
Γ(x) = Nat l pc v l l 6= O
pc 6= P⇒ l = pc Γ, l ` S
Γ, pc ` l : while(x)do S
T-Seq
Γ, pc ` S1 Γ, pc ` S2
Γ, pc ` S1;S2
Fig. 8: Type System for SCVM
Notice that some rules allow a program to get stuck. For
example, in rule S-ORAM, if the statement is l : x := oram(y)
but l 6= O, then the program will not progress. We define
a property called Γ-progress that formalizes the notion of a
program that never gets stuck.
Definition 4 (Γ-progress). Let Γ be a type environment, and
let P = P0 be a program. We say P enjoys Γ-progress








b)−−−−−−−→ 〈Mj+1, Pj+1〉 : Dj for j = 0, ..., n− 1,
either Pn = l : skip, or there exist i′a, t′a, i′b, t
′
b,M








b)−−−−−−−→ 〈M ′, P ′〉 : D′.
Γ-progress means, in particular, that the third bullet in
step (2) of the ideal functionality (Section IV-B) does not occur
for type-correct programs.
A well-typed program never gets stuck:
Theorem 2. If Γ, P ` S, then S enjoys Γ-progress.
Proofs of both theorems above can be found in Ap-
pendix A.
E. From SCVM Programs to Secure Protocols
Let P be a program, and let F be the ideal function-
ality based on this program as described earlier. Here we
define a hybrid-world protocol πG based on P , where G =
(Fop,Fmux,Foram,Fdeclass) is a fixed set of ideal functionali-
ties that implement simple binary operations (Fop), a MUX
operation (Fmux), ORAM access (Foram), and declassification
(Fdeclass). Input to each of these ideal functionalities can
either be Alice or Bob’s local inputs, public inputs, and/or
the shares of secret inputs (each share supplied by Alice
and Bob respectively). Each ideal functionality is explicitly
parameterized by the types of the inputs. Further, except
for Fdeclass which performs an explicit declassification, all
other ideal functionalities return shares of the computation or
memory fetch result to Alice and Bob, respectively. Further
details of the ideal functionalities are given in Appendix C,
along with formal definitions of the simulator and hybrid world
semantics.
Informally, the hybrid world protocol πG runs as follows:
1) Alice and Bob first agree on public values, ensuring
that MA[{P}] = MB [{P}]. During the protocol each
maintains a declassification list, for keeping track of
previously declassified values, and a secret memory that
contains shares of secret (non-ORAM) variables. To start,
both the lists and memories are empty, i.e., declsA :=
declsB := ε and MSA = M
S
B = [].
2) Alice runs her simulator (locally) on her initial memory
to obtain (ia, ta) = simA(MA, declsA), where ia and ta
cover the portion of the execution starting from just after
the last provided declassification (i.e., the final da in the
list declsA) up to the next declassification instruction or
the terminating skip statement. Bob does likewise to get
(ib, tb) = simB(MB , declsB).
3) Alice executes the instructions in ia using the hybrid-
world semantics, which reads (and writes) secret shares
from (to) MSA and obtains the values of other reads from
events observed in ta. Bob does similarly with ib, MSB
and tb. The semantics covers three cases:
• If an instruction in ia is labeled P, then so is the
corresponding instruction in ib. Both parties execute
the instruction.
• If an instruction in ia is labeled A, then Alice executes
this instruction locally. Bob does similarly for instruc-
tions labeled B.
• If an instruction in ia is labeled O, then so is the
corresponding instruction in ib. Alice and Bob call the
appropriate ideal-world functionality from G to execute
this instruction. If the instruction is a declassification,
then Fdeclass will generate an event (da, db).
4) If the last instruction executed in step 3 is a declassifica-
tion, then Alice appends her declassification to her local
declassification list (i.e., declsA := declsA++[da]), and
Bob does likewise; then both repeat step 2. Otherwise,
the protocol completes.
We have proved that if P is Γ-simulatable, then πG securely
implements F against semi-honest adversaries.
Theorem 3. (Informally) Let P be a program, F the ideal
functionality corresponding to P , and πG the protocol corre-
sponding to P as described above. If P is Γ-simulatable, then
πG securely implements F against semi-honest adversaries in
the G-hybrid model.
Using standard composition results for cryptographic pro-
tocols, we obtain as a corollary that if all ideal functionalities
in G are implemented by semi-honest secure protocols, the
resulting (real-world) protocol securely implements F against
semi-honest adversaries.
A formal definition of πG , formal theorem statement, and
a proof of the theorem can be found in Appendix C.
V. COMPILATION
We informally discuss how to compile an annotated C-like
source language into a SCVM program. An example of our
source language is:
int sum(alice int x, bob int y) {
return x<y ? 1 : 0;
}
The program’s two input variables, x and y, are annotated
as Alice’s and Bob’s data, respectively, while the unannotated
return type int indicates the result will be known to both
Alice and Bob. Programmers need not annotate any local
variables. To compile such a program into a SCVM program,
the compiler takes the following steps.
Typing the source language. As just mentioned, source level
types and initial security label annotations are assumed given.
With these, the type checker infers security labels for local
variables using a standard security type system [25] using
our lattice (Section IV-D). If no such labeling is possible
without violating security (e.g., due to a conflict in the initial
annotation), the program is rejected.
Labeling statements. The second task is to assign a security
label to each statement. For assignment statements and array
assignment statements, the label is the least upper bound of
all security labels of the variables occurring in the statement.
For an if-statement or a while-statement, the label is the least
upper bound of all security labels of the guard variables, and
all security labels in the branches or loop body.
On secret branching. The type system defined in Sec-
tion IV-D will reject an if-statement whose guard has security
label O. As such, if the program branches on secret data,
we must compile it into if-free SCVM code, using mux
instructions. The idea is to execute both branches, and use
mux to activate the relevant effects, based on the guard. To do
this, we convert the code into Static-Single-Assignment form
(SSA) [2], and then replace occurrences of the φ-operator with
a mux. The following example demonstrates this process:
if(s) then x:=1; else x:=2;
The SSA form of the above code is
if(s) then x1:=1; else x2:=2; x:=phi(x1, x2);
Then we eliminate the if-structure and substitute the φ-
operator to achieve the final code:
x1:=1; x2:=2; x:=mux(s, x1, x2)
(Note that, for simplicity, we have omitted the security
labels on the statements in the example.)
On secret while loops. The type system requires that while
loop guards only reference public data, so that the number
of iterations does not leak information. A programmer can
work around this restriction by imposing a constant bound
on the loop; e.g., manually translating while (s) do S to
while (p) do if (s) S else skip, where p defines an
upper bound on the number of iterations.
Declassification. The compiler will emit a declassification
statement for each return statement in the source program.
To avoid declassifying in the middle of local code, the type
checker in the first phase will check for this possibility and
relabel statements accordingly.
Extension for non-oblivious secret RAM. The discussion so
far supports only secret ORAMs. To support non-oblivious
secret RAM in SCVM, we add an additional security label
N such that P v N v O. To incorporate such a change, the
memory trace for the semantics should include two more kinds
of trace event, nread(x, i) and nwrite(x, i), which represent
that only the index of an access is leaked, but not the content.
Since label N only applies to arrays, we allow types Array N
but not types Nat N. The rules T-Array and T-ArrAss should
be revised to deal with the non-oblivious RAM. For example,
for rule T-ArrAss, where l is the security label for the array, l1
is the security label of the index variable and l2 is the security
label of the value variable, the type system should still restrict
l1 v l, but if l = N, the type system accepts l2 = O, but
requires l1 = P.
Correctness. We do not prove the correctness of our com-
piler, but instead can use a SCVM type checker (using the
above extension) for the generated SCVM code, ensuring it
is Γ-simulatable. Ensuring the correctness of compilers is
orthogonal and outside the scope of this work, and existing
techniques [7] can potentially be adapted to our setting.
Compiling Dijkstra’s algorithm. We explain how compi-
lation works for Dijkstra’s algorithm, previously shown in
Figure 2. First, the type checker for the source program
determines how memory should be labeled. It determines that
the security labels for bestj and bestdis should be O, and
the arrays dis and vis should be secret-shared between Alice
and Bob, since their values depend on both Alice’s input (i.e.,
the graph’s edge weights) and Bob’s input (i.e., the source).
Then, since on line 9 array vis is indexed with bestj, variable
vis should also be put in an ORAM. Similarly, on line 12,
array e is indexed by bestj so it must also be secret; as such
we must promote e, owned by Alice, to be in ORAM, which
we do by initializing a new ORAM-allocated variable orame
to e at the start of the program.
The type checker then uses the variable labeling to deter-
mine the statement labeling. Statements on lines 4–7, 9, and
11–13, require secure computation and thus are labeled as O.
Loop control-flow statements are computed publicly, so they
are labeled as P.
The two if-statements both branch on ORAM-allocated
data, so they must be converted to mux operations. Lines 4–7
are transformed (in source-level syntax) as follows
cond3 := !vis[j] && (bestj<0||dis[j]<bestdis);
bestj := mux(cond3, j, bestj);
bestdis := mux(cond3, dis[j], bestdis);
Lines 11-13 are similarly transformed
tmp := bestdis + orame[bestj*n+j];
cond4 := !vis[j] && (tmp<dis[j]);
dis[j] := mux(cond4, tmp, dis[j]);
Finally, the code is translated into SCVM’s three-address
code style syntax.
VI. EVALUATION
Programs. We have built several secure two-party computation
applications. As run-once tasks, we implemented both the
Knuth-Morris-Pratt (KMP) string-matching algorithm as well
as Dijkstra’s shortest-path algorithm. For repeated sublinear-
time database queries, we considered binary search and the
heap data structure. All applications are listed in Table II.
Compilation time. All programs took little time (e.g., under
1 second) to compile. In comparison, some earlier circuit-
model compilers involve copying datasets into circuits, and
therefore the compile-time can be large [16], [20] (e.g., Kreuter
et al. [16] report a compilation time of roughly 1000 seconds
for an implementation of an algorithm to compute graph
isomorphism on 16-node graphs).
In our experiments, we manually checked the correctness
of compiled programs (we have not yet implemented a type
checker for SCVM, though doing so should be straightfor-
ward).
A. Evaluation Methodology
Although our techniques are compatible with any cryp-
tographic back-end secure in the semi-honest model by the
definition of Canetti [5], we use the garbled circuit approach
in our evaluation [13].
We measure the computational cost by calculating the
number of encryptions required by the party running as the
circuit generator (the party running as the evaluator does
less work). For every non-XOR binary gate, the generator
makes 3 block-cipher calls; for every oblivious transfer (OT),
2 block-cipher operations are required since we rely on OT
extension [14]. For the run-once applications (i.e., Dijkstra
shortest distance, KMP-matching, aggregation, inverse per-
mutation), we count in the ORAM initialization cost when
comparing to the automated circuit approach (which doesn’t
require RAM initialization). The ORAM initialization can
be done using a Waksman shuffling network [28]. For the
applications expecting multiple executions we do not count the
ORAM initialization cost since this one-time overhead will be
amortized to (nearly) 0 over many executions.
We implemented the binary tree-based ORAM of Shi et
al. [26] using garbled circuits, so that array accesses re-
veal nothing about the (logical) addresses nor the outcomes.
Throughout the experiments, we set the ORAM bucket size
to 32 (i.e., each tree-node can store up to 32 blocks), which
corresponds to roughly 25-bit of statistical security (according
to the simulation of ORAM failures). Following Gordon et
al.’s ORAM encryption technique [10], every block is XOR-
shared (i.e., the client stores secret key k while the server
stores (r, fk(r) ⊕ m) where f is a family of psuedorandom
permutations and m the data block). This adds one additional
cipher operation per block (when the length of an ORAM
block is less than the width of the cipher). We note specific
choices of the ORAM parameters in related discussion of each
application.
Metrics. We use the number of block-cipher evaluations
as our performance metric. Measuring the performance by
the number of symmetric encryptions (instead of wall clock
times) makes it easier to compare with other systems since
the numbers can be independent of the underlying hardware
and ciphering algorithms. Additionally, in our experiments
these numbers represent bandwidth consumption since every
encryption is sent over the network. Therefore, we do not
report separately the bandwidth used. Modern processors with
AES support can compute 108 AES-128 operations per second.
B. Comparison with Automated Circuits
Presently, automated secure computation implementations
largely focus on the circuit-model of computation, handling
array accesses by linearly scanning the entire array with
a circuit every time an array lookup happens; this incurs
prohibitive overhead when the dataset is large. In this section,
we compare our approach with the existing compiled circuits,
and demonstrate that our approach scales much better with
respect to dataset size.
1) Repeated sublinear-time queries: In this scenario,
ORAM initialization is a one-time operation whose cost can
be amortized over multiple subsequent queries, achieving
sublinear amortized cost per query.
Name Alice’s Input Bob’s Input Setting
Dijkstra’s shortest path a graph a (src, dest) pair run-once
Knuth-Morris-Pratt string matching a sequence a pattern run-once
Aggregation over sliding windows a key-value table an array of keys run-once
Inverse permutation share of permutation share of permutation run-once
Binary search sorted array search key repeated sublinear-time query
Heap (insertion/extraction) share of the heap share of the heap repeated sublinear-time query
TABLE II: Programs used in our evaluation
(a) Our approach vs. automated circuit-based approach (b) Our approach vs. hand-constructed linear scan circuit
Fig. 9: Binary search
Binary search. One example application we tested is binary
search, where one party owns a confidential (sorted) array of
size n, and the other party searches for (secret) values stored
in that array.
In our experiments, we set the ORAM bucket size to 32.
For binary search, we aligned our experimental settings with
those of Gordon et al. [10], namely, assuming the size of each
data item is 512 bits. We set the recursion factor to 8 (i.e.,
each block can store up to 8 indices for the data in the upper
level recursion tree) and the recursion cut-off threshold to 1000
(namely no more recursion once fewer than 1000 units are to
be stored). Comparing to a circuit-model implementation—
which uses a circuit of size O(n log n) that implements binary
search—our approach is faster for all RAM sizes tested (see
Figure 9(a)). For n = 220, our approach achieves a 100×
speedup.
Note it is also possible to use a smaller circuit of size O(n)
that just performs a linear scan over the data. However, such
a circuit would have to be “hand-crafted,” and would not be
output by automated compilation of a binary-search program.
Our approach runs faster for large n even when compared
to such an implementation (see Figure 9(b)). On data of size
n = 220, our approach achieves a 5× speedup even when
compared to this “hand-crafted” circuit-based solution.
Heap. Besides binary search, we also implemented an oblivi-
ous heap data structure (with 32-bit payload, i.e., size of each
item). The costs of insertion and extraction respecting various
heap sizes are given in Figure 10(a) and 10(b), respectively.
The basic shapes of the performance curves are very similar
to that for binary search (except that heap extraction is twice
as slow as insertion because two comparisons are needed per
level). We can observe an 18× speedup for both heap insertion
and heap extraction when the heap size is 220.
The speedup of our heap implementation over automated
circuits is even greater when the size of the payload is bigger.
At 512-bit payload, we have an 100× speedup for data size
220. This is due to the extra work incurred from realizing the
ORAM mechanism, which grows (in poly-logarithmic scale)
with the size of the RAM but independent of the size of each
data item.
2) Faster one-time executions: We present two applica-
tions: the Knuth-Morris-Pratt string-matching algorithm (rep-
resentative of linear-time RAM programs) and Dijkstra’s
shortest-path algorithm (representative of super-linear time
RAM programs). We compare our approach with a naive
program-to-circuit compiler which copies the entire array for
every dynamic memory access.
The Knuth-Morris-Pratt algorithm. Alice has a secret string
T (of length n) while Bob has a secret pattern P (of length
m) and wants to scan through Alice’s string looking for this
pattern. The original KMP algorithm runs in O(n + m) time
when T and P are in plaintext. Our compiler compiles an
implementation of KMP into a secure string matching protocol
preserving its linear efficiency up to a polylogarithmic factor
(due to the ORAM technique).
We assume the string T and the pattern P both consist of
16-bit characters. The recursion factor of the ORAM is set to
16. Figure 11(a) and 11(b) show our results compared to those
when a circuit-model compiler is used. From Figure 11(a), we
can observe that our approach is slower than the circuit-based
(a) Heap insertion (b) Heap extraction
Fig. 10: Heap operations
(a) Median n (fixing m = 50) (b) Large n (fixing m = 50)
Fig. 11: KMP string matching
approach on small datasets, since the overhead of the ORAM
protocol dominates in such cases. However, the circuit-based
approach’s running time increases more quickly as the dataset’s
size increases. When m = 50 and n = 2 × 106, our program
runs 21× faster.
Dijkstra’s algorithm. Here Alice has a secret graph while Bob
has a secret source/destination pair and wishes to compute the
shortest distance between them. Compiling from a standard
Dijkstra shortest-path algorithm, we obtain an O(n2 log3 n)-
overhead RAM-model protocol.
In our experiment, Alice’s graph is represented by an n×n
adjacency matrix (of 32-bit integers) where n is the number of
vertices in the graph. The distances associated with the edges
are denoted by 32-bit integers. We set ORAM recursion factor
to 8. The results (Figure 12(a)) show that our scheme runs
faster for all sizes of graphs tested. As the performance of our
protocol is barely noticeable in Figure 12(a), the performance
gaps between the two protocols for various n is explicitly
plotted in Figure 12(b). Note the shape of the speedup curve
is roughly quadratic.
Aggregation over sliding windows. Alice has a key-value
table, and Bob has a (size-n) array of keys. The secure
computation task is the following: for every size-k window
on the key array, look up k values corresponding to Bob’s
k keys within the window, and output the minimum value.
Our compiler outputs a O(n log3 n) protocol to accomplish
the task. The optimized protocol performs significantly better,
as shown in Figure 13 (we fixed the window size k to 1000
and set recursion factor to 8, while varying the dataset from 1
to 6 million pairs).
C. Comparison with RAM-SC Baselines
Benefits of instruction-trace obliviousness. The RAM-SC
technique of Gordon et al. [10], described in Section II-A,
uses a universal next-instruction circuit to hide the program
counter and the instructions executed. Each instruction in-
volves ORAM operations for instruction and data fetches,
and the next-instruction circuit must effectively execute all
possible instructions and use an n-to-1 multiplexer to select the
right outcome. Despite the lack of concrete implementation for
their general approach, we show through back-of-the-envelope
calculations that our approach should be orders-of-magnitude
faster.
Consider the problem of binary search over a 1-million
item dataset: in each iteration, there are roughly 10 instructions
to run, hence 200 instructions in total to complete the search.
To run every instruction, a universal-circuit-based implemen-
tation has to execute every possible instruction defined in its
instruction set. Even if we conservatively assume a RISC-
style instruction set, we would require over 9 million (non-
free) binary gates to execute just a memory read/write over
(a) Performance (b) Speedup
Fig. 12: Dijkstra’s shortest-path algorithm
(a) Performance (b) Speedup
Fig. 13: Aggregation over sliding windows
(a) Inverse permutation (b) Dijkstra
Fig. 14: Savings by memory-trace obliviousness optimization. In (a), the non-linearity (around 60) of the curve is due to the
increase of the ORAM recursion level at that point.
a 512M bit RAM. Plus, an extra ORAM read is required to
obliviously fetch every instruction. Thus, at least a total of
3600 million binary gates are needed, which is more than
20 times slower than our result exploiting instruction trace
obliviousness. Furthermore, notice that binary search is merely
a case where the program traces are very short (with only
logarithmic length). Due to the overwhelming cost of ORAM
read/write instructions, we stress that the performance gap will
be much greater with respect to programs that have relatively
fewer memory read/write instructions (comparing to binary
search, 1 out of 10 instructions is a memory read instruction).
Benefits of memory-trace obliviousness. In addition to avoid-
ing the overhead of a next-instruction circuit, SCVM avoids
the overhead of storing all arrays in a single, large ORAM.
Instead, SCVM can store some arrays as non-oblivious secret
shared memory, and others in separate ORAM banks, rather
than one large ORAM. Doing so does not compromise security
because the type system ensures memory-trace obliviousness.
Here we assess the advantages of these optimizations by
comparing against SCVM programs compiled without the
optimizations enabled. The results for two applications are
given in Figure 14.
• Inverse permutation. Consider a permutation of size n,
represented by an array a of n distinct numbers from 1
to n, i.e., the permutation maps the i-th object to the
a[i]-th object. One common computation would be to
compute its inverse, e.g., to do an inverse table lookup
using secret indices. The inverse permutation (with result
stored in array b) can be computed with the loop:
while (i < n) { b[a[i]]=i; i=i+1;}
The memory-trace obliviousness optimization automat-
ically identifies that the array a doesn’t need to be
put in ORAM though its content should remain secret
(because the access pattern to a is entirely public known).
This yields 50% savings, which is corroborated by our
experiment results (Figure 14(a)).
• Dijkstra’s shortest path. We discussed the advantages
of memory-trace obliviousness in Section III with respect
to Dijkstra’s algorithm. Our experiments show that we
consistently save 15 ∼ 20% for all graph sizes. The
savings rates for smaller graphs are in fact higher even
though it is barely noticeable in the chart because of the
fast (super-quadratic) growth of overall cost.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We describe the first automated approach for RAM-model
secure computation. Directions for future work include ex-
tending our framework to support malicious security; applying
orthogonal techniques (e.g., [7]) to ensure correctness of the
compiler; incorporating other cryptographic backends into our
framework; and adding additional language features such as
higher-dimensional arrays and structured data types.
Acknowledgments. We thank Hubert Chan, Dov Gordon,
Feng-Hao Liu, Emil Stefanov, and Hong-Sheng Zhou for
helpful discussions. We also thank the anonymous reviewers
and our shepherd for their insightful feedback and comments.
We acknowledge a generous grant from Amazon AWS. This
research was funded by NSF awards CNS-1111599, CNS-
1223623, and CNS-1314857, a Google Faculty Research
Award, and by the US Army Research Laboratory and the UK
Ministry of Defence under Agreement Number W911NF-06-
3-0001. The views and conclusions contained herein are those
of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the
official policies, either expressed or implied, of the US Army
Research Laboratory, the U.S. Government, the UK Ministry
of Defense, or the UK Government. The US and UK Govern-
ments are authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for
Government purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation
hereon.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Agat. Transforming out timing leaks. In POPL, 2000.
[2] B. Alpern, M. N. Wegman, and F. K. Zadeck. Detecting equality
of variables in programs. In In POPL, 1988.
[3] A. Askarov, S. Hunt, A. Sabelfeld, and D. Sands. Termination-
insensitive noninterference leaks more than just a bit. In
ESORICS, 2008.
[4] M. Bellare, V. T. Hoang, S. Keelveedhi, and P. Rogaway.
Efficient garbling from a fixed-key blockcipher. In IEEE S &
P, 2013.
[5] R. Canetti. Security and composition of multiparty crypto-
graphic protocols. Journal of Cryptology, 2000.
[6] H. Carter, B. Mood, P. Traynor, and K. Butler. Secure
outsourced garbled circuit evaluation for mobile devices. In
USENIX Security, 2013.
[7] COMPCERT: Compilers you can formally trust. http://compcert.
inria.fr/.
[8] O. Goldreich and R. Ostrovsky. Software protection and
simulation on oblivious RAMs. J. ACM, May 1996.
[9] M. T. Goodrich and M. Mitzenmacher. Privacy-preserving
access of outsourced data via oblivious RAM simulation. In
ICALP, 2011.
[10] S. D. Gordon, J. Katz, V. Kolesnikov, F. Krell, T. Malkin,
M. Raykova, and Y. Vahlis. Secure two-party computation in
sublinear (amortized) time. In CCS, 2012.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
We begin by discussing how to construct simA; the simu-
lator simB is constructed similarly.
Since Alice does not have the view of Bob’s local data, and
those data secret-shared between them two, we define a special
notion • as the values not observable to Alice. We define the
operations on top of • as follows:
• op v = • v op • = • • (v) = • m(•) = •
We define the following auxiliary functions accordingly:
(selectA(l, t, t
′), selectB(l, t, t
′)) := select(l, t, t′)
readA(l, v) :=
{
v l v A
• otherwise
val(v, l) := v
val(m, l) := m
lab(v, l) := l
lab(m, l) := l
We then define Alice’s snapshot of a memory M , denoted
as M ↓A, in the following:
Definition 5. Given a memory M , Alice’s snapshot of M ,
denoted as M ↓ A, is defined as a memory such that
M ↓A(x) =
{
M(x) if M(x) = (v, l) where l v A
• otherwise
We further define the Alice-similarity property of two
memories as follows:
Definition 6. We say two memories M1 and M2 are Alice-
similar, denoted as M1 ∼A M2, if and only if M1 ↓A = M2 ↓
A.
Figure 15 defines how simA evaluate an expression. The
judgement in the form of l `A 〈M, e〉 ⇓t v says that given a
memory M , the simulator simA evaluates an expression e to
value v, producing memory trace t.
Figure 16 defines how simA simulates the instruction- and
memory-traces until the next declassification. The judgement
〈Mi, Si〉
(i,t)−−→A 〈M ′i , S′i〉 says that given a statement Si and a
memory M , simA evaluates the program Si over memory Mi
and reduces to program S′i and memory M
′
i emitting Alice’s
instruction trace i and memory trace t.
The judgement 〈Mi, Si〉
(i,t)−−→
?
A 〈M ′i , S′i〉 is similar to
〈Mi, Si〉
(i,t)−−→A 〈M ′i , S′i〉, but requires the last statement
evaluated must be a declassification statement. We emphasize
that our rules enforce that the memory over which the program
is evaluated must be Γ-compatible.
The simulator simA(M,S,D1, ..., Dn) runs as follows.
Initially set M1 to be M and S1 to be S. For each i = 1, ..., n,
simA evaluates 〈Mi, Si〉
(i,t)−−→
?
A 〈M ′i , S′i〉. If Di = ε, then
set Mi+1 to be M ′i ; otherwise, Di = (x, v), set Mi+1 to




〈M ′, S′〉, and returns (i, t).
The following lemma shows that the semantics for simA
generates the same memory trace as the semantics for SCVM.
Lemma 1. If l ` 〈M, e〉 ⇓(ta,tb) v and Γ ` e : Nat l′ and
l `A 〈M ′, e〉 ⇓t v′ and M ∼A M ′, and l′ v l, and M and
M ′ are Γ-compatible, then ta ≡ t and if l v A, then v = v′.
Otherwise v′ = •.
Proof: Prove by structural induction on e. If e = x,
then Γ(x) = Nat l′. If l v A, then v′ = val(M ′(x)) =
val(M(x)) = v, therefore v = v′. Further t = read(x, v′) =
read(x, v) = ta if l v A. If l = B, then v′ = •, and t = ε = ta.
If l = O, then v′ = •, and t = x = ta.
If e = n, then t = ε = ta, and v′ = n = v, and l = P v A.
If e = x1 op x2. Then we know l `A 〈M ′, xi〉 ⇓ti v′i,
and 〈M,xi〉 ⇓(tia,tib) vi for i = 1, 2. By induction assumption,
we know ti ≡ tia, and thus t = t1@t2 ≡ t1a@t2a = ta. For its
value, suppose Γ(xi) = Nat li, i = 1, 2, if l v A, then li v A
holds true, and by induction assumption, we know vi = v′i for
i = 1, 2, and thus v = v1 op v2 = v′1 op v2 = v
′. Otherwise,
either or both v1 and v2 are •, and thus we know v′ = •.
If e = x[y]. We first reason about the value. If l v A,
then suppose Γ(y) = Nat l′′, then l′′ v l′ v l v A according
to Γ ` x[y] : Nat l′. Then we know v′1 = val(M ′(y)) =
val(M(y)) = v1. Further, we know (m′, l) = M ′(x) =
M(x) = (m, l), and thus v′ = get(m′, v′1) = get(m, v1) = v.
If l 6v A, then v = •.
Then we reason about the trace. If l v A,
then t = read(y, v1)@readarr(x, v1, v) ≡
read(y, v′1)@readarr(x, v1, v′) = ta. If l = B, we have
t ≡ ε ≡ ta. If l = O, we have t ≡ y@x ≡ ta.
For e = mux(x1, x2, x3), based on a very similar argument
as for x1 op x2, we can get the conclusion.
The following lemma further claims that if an expression
has a type B, then simulating it will generate no observable
instruction traces and memory traces to Alice.
Lemma 2. If Γ ` e : Nat l′, and B ` 〈M, e〉 ⇓t v, and M is
Γ-compatible then t ≡ ε.
Proof: Prove by structure induction on e. If e = x, then
t = ε by rule Sim-E-Var.
If e = x1 op x2. Suppose Γ ` xi : Nat li for i = 1, 2, then
we know li v B. Therefore ti ≡ ε, and thus t ≡ ε.
If e = x[y], the conclusion follows the fact that B `
〈M,y〉 ⇓ε v, and selectA(B, readarr(x, v1, v), x) = ε.
If e = mux(x1, x2, x3), similar to binary operation, we
know t ≡ ε.
Lemma 3. If B ` S, and 〈M,S〉 (ia,ta,ib,tb)−−−−−−−→ 〈M ′, S′〉, where
M is Γ-compatible, then ia ≡ ε, ta ≡ ε, and M ∼A M ′
Proof: We prove by induction on the structure of S. If
S = l : skip, then the conclusion is trivial.
l `A 〈M, e〉 ⇓ta v
Sim-E-Const l `A 〈M,n〉 ⇓ε n
Sim-E-Var
lab(M(x)) = l′ v = readA(l, val(M(x)))
t = selectA(l, read(x, v), x)
l `A 〈M,x〉 ⇓t v
Sim-E-Op
lab(M(xi)) = li l `A 〈M,xi〉 ⇓ti vi
t = t1@t2 v = v1 op v2 i = 1, 2
l `A 〈M,x1 op x2〉 ⇓t v
Sim-E-Array
lab(M(y)) = l′ l `A 〈M,y〉 ⇓t1 v
lab(M(x)) = l′′ v1 = val(M(x))
t2 = selectA(l, readarr(x, v1, v), x)
t = t1@t2 v2 = readA(l, val(M(x))(v))
l `A 〈M,x[y]〉 ⇓t v2
Sim-E-Mux
lab(M(xi)) = Nat li l `A 〈M,xi〉 ⇓ti vi i = 1, 2, 3
v1 = 0⇒ v = v2 v1 6= 0⇒ v = v3
v1 = • ⇒ v = • t = t1@t2@t3
l `A 〈M,mux(x1, x2, x3)〉 ⇓t v
Fig. 15: Operational semantics for simA
If S = l : x := e, then we know l = B and Γ(x) = Nat B.
Then ia = ε and M ′ ∼A M follow trivially. According to
Lemma 2, we can prove ta ≡ ε.
If S = O : x := oram(y) or S = O : x := declassl(y),
then pc is required to be P, so that the conclusion is vacuous.
If S = l : y[x1] := x2, then l = B, and thus ia = ε.
Therefore ta = t1a@t2a@t′a, where B ` 〈M,xi〉 ⇓(tia,tib) vi
for i = 1, 2, and t′a = selectA(B,writearr(y, v1, v2), y) = ε.
Therefore t1a ≡ t2a ≡ ε according to Lemma 2. In conclusion,
we have ta = t1a@t2a@t′a ≡ ε. Finally, for memory, M ′ =
M [y 7→ m′] ∼A M .
If S = l : if(x)then S1 else S2, then l = B, and Γ, B ` Si





〈M,Sc〉, where v = 1 ⇒ c = 1 and v 6= 1 ⇒ c = 2. There
are two cases: (1) M ′ = M and S = Sc, then the conclusion







b )−−−−−−−−→ 〈M ′, S′〉. In this case, by
induction assumption, we have M ′ ∼A M , i′′a ≡ ε and t′′a ≡ ε,
so that ia = ε@i′′a ≡ ε and ta = ε@t′′a ≡ ε.
For S = l : while(x)do S′, the conclusion can be proven
similarly to the if-case.
Finally, for S = S1;S2, we know either (1)
〈S1,M〉
























a . In both cases, the conclusions
can be proven easily.
The following lemma is the main lemma saying that when
evaluating over Alice-similar memories, simA and SCVM will
generate the same instruction traces and memory traces, and
produce Alice-similar memory profiles.
Lemma 4. If 〈M,S〉 (ia,ta,ib,tb)−−−−−−−→ 〈M1, S′〉 : D where Γ, P `
S, and M ∼A M ′, and 〈M ′, S〉
(i,t)−−→A 〈M ′1, S′′〉 (for D = ε)
or 〈M ′, S〉 (i,t)−−→
?
A 〈M ′1, S′′〉 (for D 6= ε), then S′ = S′′,
ia ≡ i and ta ≡ t. If D = ε, then M1 ∼A M ′1; otherwise,
suppose D = (x, v), then M1 = M ′1[x 7→ v].
Proof: The conclusion S′ = S′′ can be trivially done by
examining the correspondence of each E- and S- rules and
Sim- rules. Therefore, we only prove (1) M1 ∼A M ′1, (2)
ia ≡ i, and (3) ta ≡ t.
We prove by induction on the length of steps L toward
generating declassification event D. If L = 0, then we know
S = O : x := declassl(y);S2 (or O : x := declassl(y)).
Since we assume Γ, P ` S, by typing rule T-Declass, we have
l 6= O, Γ(x) = Nat l. If l v A, then D[A] = (x, v), and
thus M ′1[x 7→ v] ∼A M [x 7→ v] = M1. Further, we know
ia = declass(x, y) = i, and ta = y = t. Second, if lx = B,
then M ′1 = M
′ ∼A M = M1, ia = declass(x, y) = i, and
ta = y = t.
We next consider L > 0, then S = S1;S2. Since
(Sa;Sb);Sc is equivalent to Sa; (Sb;Sc) in the sense that
if 〈M, (Sa;Sb);Sc〉








b)−−−−−−−→ 〈M ′, S′〉 : D, where ia ≡ i′a,
ib ≡ i′b, ta ≡ t′a, and tb ≡ t′b. Therefore we only consider
S1 not to be a Seq statement, then we know S1 = l : s1. By
taking one step, we only need to prove claims (1)-(3), then
the conclusion can be shown by induction assumption. In the
following, we consider how this step is executed.
Case l : skip. If S1 = l : skip, the conclusion is trivial, i.e.
ia = ε = i and ta = ε = t and M ′1 = M
′ ∼A M = M1.
Case l : x := e. If S1 = l : x := e, ia = l : x := e = i. Then
we show t ≡ ta. If l v A, t ≡ ta directly follows Lemma 1.
If l = B, then by Lemma 2, we have t ≡ ε ≡ tb. If l = O,
then we consider e separately. If e = y, then t = y@x = ta.
If e = y[z], then t = z@y@x = ta. If e = n, then t =
x = ta. If e = y op z, then t = y@z@x = ta. Finally, if
e = mux(x1, x2, x3), then t = x1@x2@x3@x = ta.
Finally, we prove the memory equivalence. If l v A, then
according to Lemma 1, e evaluates to the same value v in
the semantics, and in the simulator. Therefore M ′1 = M
′[x 7→
v] ∼A M [x 7→ v] = M1. If B v l, then M ′1 = M ′ ∼A M ∼A
M [x 7→ v] = M1. Therefore, the conclusion is true.
Case O : x := oram(y). It is easy to see that M ′1 = M ′ ∼A
〈M,S〉 (i,t)−−−→
?
A 〈M ′, S′〉 Sim-Declass
t = y i = declass(x, y)
〈M, O : x := declassl(y)〉
(i,t)−−−→
?









A 〈M ′, S′1;S2〉
Sim-Concat
〈M,S, ε〉 (i,t)−−−→A 〈M ′, S′, ε〉
〈M ′, S′〉 (i
′,t′)−−−−→
?




A 〈M ′′, S′′〉
〈M,S〉 (i,t)−−−→A 〈M ′, S′〉
Sim-Skip 〈M, l : skip;S〉 (ε,ε)−−−→A 〈M,S〉
Sim-ORAM
lab(M(x)) = O lab(M(y)) = l
t = select(l, y, y)@x i = l : init(x, y)
〈M, O : x := oram(y)〉 (i,t)−−−→A 〈M, O : skip〉
Sim-ArrAss
l `A 〈M,xj〉 ⇓tj vj j = 1, 2 lab(M(y)) = l
l v A⇒M ′ = M [y 7→ set(val(M(y)), v1, v2)]
B v l⇒M ′ = M
t = t1@t2@selectA(l,writearr(y, v1, v2), y)
i = selectA(l, l : y[x1] := x2, l : y[x1] := x2)
〈M, l : y[x1] := x2〉
(i,t)−−−→A 〈M ′, l : skip〉
Sim-Assign
lab(M(x)) = l l `A 〈M, e〉 ⇓t′ v
l v A⇒M ′ = M [x 7→ (v, l′)]
B v l⇒M ′ = M
t = t′@selectA(l,write(x, v), x)
i = selectA(l, l : x := e, l : x := e)
〈M, l : x := e〉 (i,t)−−−→A 〈M ′, l : skip〉
Sim-Cond
l `A 〈M,x〉 ⇓t′ v
v = 1⇒ c = 1 v 6= 1⇒ c = 2
i = selectA(l, l : if(x), l : if(x))
t = selectA(l, t
′, t′)
l v A⇒ S′ = Sc l = B⇒ S′ = P : skip
〈M, l : if(x)then S1else S2〉
(i,t)−−−→A 〈M,S′〉
Sim-While-True
lab(M(x)) = l l v A
l `A 〈M,x〉 ⇓t v v 6= 0
S = l : while(x)do S′
〈M,S〉 (l:while(x),t)−−−−−−−→A 〈M,S′;S〉
Sim-While-False
lab(M(x)) = l l v A
l `A 〈M,x〉 ⇓t v v = 0
S = l : while(x)do S′
〈M,S〉 (l:while(x),t)−−−−−−−→A 〈M, P : skip〉
Sim-While-Ignore
S = B : while(x)do S′
〈M,S〉 (ε,ε)−−−→A 〈M, l : skip〉
Fig. 16: Operational semantics for statements in simA
M ∼A M [x 7→ m] = M1, and i = O : init(x, y) = ia.
Suppose Γ(y) = Nat l, then we know l 6= O. If l v A, then
t = y@x = ta. Otherwise, l = B, then we know t = x = ta.
Case l : y[x1] := x2. By typing rule T-ArrAss, we know
Γ(y) = Array l, Γ(x1) = Nat l1, Γ(x2) = Nat l2,
where l1 v A and l2 v A. If l v A, then we have
ta = read(x1, v1)@read(x2, v2)@writearr(a, v1, v2) = t,
and ia = l : y[x1] := x2 = i. For memory, M?? =
M ′[y 7→ set(m, v1, v2)] ∼A M [y 7→ set(m, v1, v2)] = M?,
where (m, l) = M ′(y) = M(y), (v1, l1) = M(x1), and
(v2, l2) = M(x2).
If l = B, then M ′1 = M
′ ∼A M ∼A M [y 7→ m′] = M1,
i = ε = ia, t = ε = ta.
Case l : if(x)then S1else S2. If l = B, then according to
Lemma 3, M ′1 = M
′ ∼A M ∼A M1, t ≡ εta, and i ≡ εia.
If l v A, then i = l : if(x) = ia, and t = read(x, v) = ta.
Further, M ′1 = M
′ ∼A M = M1. Therefore, the conclusion is
also true.
Case l : while(x)do S′. For S1 = while(x)do Sb, the proof
is very similar to the if-statement.
Lemma 4 immediately shows that simA can simulate the
correct traces. Therefore Theorem 1 holds true. Q.E.D
B. Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 is a corollary of the following theorem:
Theorem 4. If Γ, pc ` S, then either S is l : skip, or for any Γ-
compatible memory M , there exist ia, ta, ib, tb,M ′, S′, D such
that 〈M,S〉 (ia,ta,ib,tb)−−−−−−−→ 〈M ′, S′〉 : D, M ′ is Γ-compatible,
and Γ, pc ` S′.
Proof: We prove by induction on the structure of S. If
S = l : skip, then the conclusion is trivial.
If S = l : x := e, then Γ(x) = Nat l, Γ ` e :
Nat l′, pc t l′ v l. We discuss the type of e. If e = x′,
then we know Γ(x′) = Nat l′. Since M is Γ−compatible,
we know M(x′) = (v, l′), where v ∈ Nat. Therefore,
〈M,x′〉 ⇓(ta,tb) v, where (ta, tb) = select(l, read(x′, v), x′),




b)−−−−−−−→ 〈M ′, l : skip〉 : ε, where
(ia, ib) = inst(l, x := e), t′a = ta@t
′′







b ) = select(l,write(x, v), x). Further, M ′ = M [x 7→
(v, l)]. Therefore, M ′ is also Γ-compatible, and the conclusion
holds true. Similarly, we can prove that if Γ ` e : τ is derived
using T-Const, T-Op, T-Array, or T-Mux, then the conclusion
is also true.
If S = O : x := declassl(y), then Γ(y) = Nat O, Γ(x) =
Nat l where l 6= O, and pc = P. Since M is Γ−compatible,
we know M(y) = (v,O), M ′ = M [x 7→ (v, l)]. Therefore
M ′ is Γ−compatible. Further, ta = y = tb, ia = ib = O :
declass(x, y), D = select(l, (x, v), ε), and 〈M,S〉 (ia,ta,ib,tb)−−−−−−−→
〈M ′, O : skip〉, and we know that Γ, P ` O : skip. Therefore
the conclusion is true.
Similarly, we can prove the conclusion is true for S = O :
x := oram(y).
For S = l : y[x1] := x2, then Γ(y) = Array l,
Γ(x1) = Nat l1, Γ(x2) = Nat l2, and pc t l1 t l2 v
l. Since M is Γ−compatible, we know M(y) = (m, l),
M(x1) = (v1, l1), and M(x2) = (v2, l2). Therefore M ′ =
M [y 7→ (set(m, v1, v2), l)] is also Γ−compatible. Further,
(t′a, t
′
b) = select(l,writearr(y, v1, v2), y), ta = t1a@t2a@t′a,
tb = t1b@t2b@t
′
b, and (ia, ib) = inst(l, y[x1] := x2).
Therefore, 〈M,S〉 (ia,ta,ib,tb)−−−−−−−→ 〈M ′, l : skip〉, where we can
prove Γ, pc ` l : skip easily. Therefore, the conclusion is true.
For S = l : if(x)then S1 else S2, we have Γ(x) = Nat l.
Therefore M(x) = (v, l). If v = 1, then 〈M,S〉 ia,ta,ib,tb−−−−−−→
〈M,S1 where (ia, ib) = inst(l, if(x)) and (ta, tb) =
select(l, read(x, v), x). Further, we know Γ, l ` S1. Since
pc v l, it is easy to prove by induction that Γ, pc ` S1 is
true as well. Therefore, the conclusion is true. On the other
hand, if v 6= 1, then 〈M,S〉 ia,ta,ib,tb−−−−−−→ 〈M,S2〉. We can also
prove the conclusion.
The proof for S = l : while(x)do S′ is similar to the
branching-statement by using rule S-While-True and S-While-
False.
For S = S1;S2, then we know Γ ` S1. The conclusion
directly follows the induction assumption by applying rule S-
Seq and rule S-Skip.
C. The hybrid protocol and the proof of Theorem 3
In this section, we present the hybrid protocol, and show
it emulates the ideal world functionality F . To start with, we
present smaller ideal functionalities in G used by the hybrid
world protocol.
1) F (l1,l2)op are the ideal functionalities for binary operation
op. They are parameterized by two type labels l1 and l2
from {P, A, B, O} indicating which party provides the data
to the functionality. Suppose the operation is x op y. l1
and l2 correspond to x and y respectively. If l1 is P , then
both Alice and Bob will hand in the value of x, and the
functionality verifies these two values are the same. If l1
is A (or B), then Alice (or Bob) hands in the value of x to
the functionality. If l1 is O, then both Alice and Bob hand
in their secret shares to the functionality respectively. The
value of l2 has the same meaning but is for the data source
of y. These ideal functionalities output secret shares of the
result to Alice and Bob respectively. For example, F (P,A)op
accepts input x, y from Alice, and x from Bob and return
the results [v]a to Alice and [v]b to Bob. We denote this
as ([v]a, [v]b) = F (P,A)op (x@y, x).
2) F (l1,l2,l3)mux are the ideal functionalities for the multiplex
operations. The three parameters l1, l2, and l3 have the
same meaning as above, but correspond to the three
input of the multiplex operation. These functionalities also
return secret shares to Alice and Bob.
3) Fxoram for each array x is an interactive Oblivious RAM
functionality. It supports three operations.
• initl to initialize the ORAM with a given array. l is
from {P, A, B}. If l is P or A, then Alice hands in her
array. If l is B, then Bob hands in his array.
• read to read the content for a given index. The index
is provided as a pair of secret shares from Alice and
Bob. The output is also a pair of secret shares, which
are returned to Alice and Bob respectively.
• write to write a value into a given index. It takes four
inputs: the secret shares of the index and the secret
shares of the values from Alice and Bob respectively.
4) F ldeclass is the declassification function, which takes
secret shares from Alice and Bob as its input, and returns
the revealed value to the party corresponding to l.
The protocol ΠG is then presented in Figure 17, Figure 18,
and Figure 19. During the protocol’s execution, Alice and Bob
consumes their instruction traces and memory traces. Since the
memory traces contain all information of the public memory
and their local memories, both Alice and Bob only store locally
their secret shares [M ]A and [M ]B and the instruction- and
memory- traces.
Figure 18 and Figure 17 present the rules for local exe-
cution. Since all local and public data to be used in secure
computation are contained in memory traces, Alice and Bob
do not maintain their local data and public data. The rules
are in the form of (i, t)→ (ε, ε), which means the instruction
trace i and memory trace t will be consumed. In each rule,
only one local instruction, i.e. the security label l 6= O, and
its corresponding memory trace for each instruction will be
consumed. It is not hard to verify the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Assuming 〈M,S〉 (ia,ta,ib,tb)−−−−−−−→ 〈M ′, S′〉 : ε.
Assume s is a statement in the set {x := e, x[x] :=
x, if(x),while(x)}. If ia = l : s, where l 6= O, then (ia, ta)→
(ε, ε). If ib = l : s, where l 6= O, then (ib, tb)→ (ε, ε).
Note local execution rules only handle executing one
instruction. The sequence of multiple instructions are handled
using rule H-LocalA, H-LocalB, and H-Seq explained later.
Local execution
L-Assign-Const
i = l : x := n l 6= O
t = write(x, v)
(i, t)→
L-Assign-Var
i = l : x := y l 6= O
t = read(y, v)@write(x, v)
(i, t)→
L-Assign-Op
i = l : x := y op z l 6= O
t = read(y, v1)@read(z, v2)@write(x, v)
(i, t)→
L-Assign-Array
i = l : x := y[z] l 6= O
t = read(z, v′)@readarr(y, v′, v)@write(x, v)
(i, t)→
L-Assign-Mux
i = l : x := mux(x1, x2, x3) l 6= O
ti = read(xi, vi) i = 1, 2, 3
t = t1@t2@t3@write(x, v)
(i, t)→
L-ArrAss
i = l : a[x1] := x2 l 6= O
t = read(x1, v1)@read(x2, v2)@writearr(a, v1, v2)
(i, t)→
L-Cond
i = l : if(x) l 6= O
t = read(x, v)
(i, t)→
L-While
i = l : while(x) l 6= O
t = read(x, v)
(i, t)→
Fig. 17: Local execution
Secure Evaluation of Expressions 〈[M ]A, ta, [M ]B , tb, e〉 ⇓ ([v]a, [v]b)
SE-Const
([v]a, [v]b) = F (A,B)+ (n, 0)
〈[M ]A, ε, [M ]B , ε, n〉 ⇓ ([v]a, [v]b)
SE-Op
([v]a, [v]b) = F (Γ(x),Γ(y))op ([M ]A〈ta〉, [M ]B〈tb〉)
〈[M ]A, ta, [M ]B , tb, x op y〉 ⇓ ([v]a, [v]b)
SE-Var
(ta, tb) = select(Γ(x), read(x, v), x)
Γ(x) v A⇒ ([v]a, [v]b) = F (A,B)+ (v, 0)
Γ(x) = B⇒ ([v]a, [v]b) = F (A,B)+ (0, v)
Γ(x) = O⇒ ([v]a, [v]b) = ([M ]A(x), [M ]B(x))
〈[M ]A, ta, [M ]B , tb, x〉 ⇓ ([v]a, [v]b)
SE-Mux
([v]a, [v]b) = F (Γ(x),Γ(y),Γ(z))mux ([M ]A〈ta〉, [M ]B〈tb〉)




a@y tb = t
′
b@y
〈[M ]A, t′a, [M ]B , t′b, x〉 ⇓ ([v′]a, [v′]b)
([v]a, [v]b) = Fyoram(read, [v′]a, [v′]b)










b Γ(y) 6= O
(t′′a , t
′′
b ) = select(Γ(y), readarr(y, v1, v), y)
Γ(y) v A⇒ ([v]a, [v]b) = F (A,B)+ (v, 0)
Γ(y) = B⇒ ([v]a, [v]b) = F (A,B)+ (0, v)
〈[M ]A, ta, [M ]B , tb, y[x]〉 ⇓ ([v]a, [v]b)
Fig. 18: Hybrid Protocol πG (Part I)
Figure 19 presents two parts. The first part consists the
rules, in the form of 〈[M ]A, ta, [M ]B , tb, e〉 ⇓ ([v]a, [v]b),
which securely evaluate an expression e. [M ]A and [M ]B are
the mapping from variables to their secret shares, and ta and
tb are memory traces from Alice and Bob respectively. All
information to evaluate e are contained in [M ]A, [M ]B , ta, and
tb. The result is in the format of ([v]a, [v]b), where [v]a and [v]b
are secret shares of the result for Alice and Bob respectively.
The rules restrict that ta and tb must be the memory traces
generated by the ideal functionality F when evaluating e.
Rule SE-Const deals with constant expression n.
([v]a, [v]b) can be acquired by secret-sharing n, which is
implemented using F (A,B)+ (n, 0). Rule SE-Var secret shares
the value of a variable expression x. The value of x can be
extracted from [M ]A and [M ]B , ta, or tb according to Γ(x). If
Γ(x) is P or A, then ta = read(x, v), and [v]a and [v]b can be
computed using F (A,B)+ (v, 0). If Γ(x) is B, the computation
is similar, but Bob hands in his value v. If Γ(x) is O, then
[M ]A(x) and [M ]B(x) can be directly returned.
Rule SE-OP handles a binary operation x op y. It can
be directly computed using a binary operation functionality
F (Γ(x),Γ(y))op . The input to the functionality is [M ]A〈ta〉 and
[M ]B〈tb〉, which is defined as follows. Suppose [M ] is a
mapping from variables to secret shares, and t is a trace. Then
[M ]〈t〉 is defined inductively as
[M ]〈read(x, v)〉 = v [M ]〈x〉 = [M ](x)
[M ]〈t1@t2〉 = [M ]〈t1〉@[M ]〈t2〉
Hybrid Protocol 〈[M ]A, i, ta〉, 〈[M ]B , i, tb〉 〈[M ′]A, ε, ε〉, 〈[M ]′B , ε, ε〉 : D
H-ORAM
i = O : init(x, y) ta = t′a@x tb = t′b@x
(t′a, t
′
b) = select(Γ(y), arr(y,m))
Fxoram(initΓ(y),m)
〈[M ]A, i, ta〉, 〈[M ]B , i, tb〉 〈[M ]A, ε, ε〉, 〈[M ]B , ε, ε〉 : ε
H-Assign
i = O : x := e 〈[M ]A, t′a, [M ]B , t′b, e〉 ⇓ ([v]a, [v]b)
ta = t
′
a@x tb = t
′
b@x
[M ′]A = [M ]A[x 7→ [v]a] [M ′]B = [M ]A[x 7→ [v]b]
〈[M ]A, i, ta〉, 〈[M ]B , i, tb〉 〈[M ′]A, ε, ε〉, 〈[M ′]B , ε, ε〉 : ε
H-ArrAss
i = O : y[x1] := x2 ta = t
′
a@y tb = t
′
b
ta = t1a@t2a@y tb = t1b@t2b@y
(tia, tib) = select(Γ(xi), read(xi, vi), xi)
〈[M ]A, t′ia, [M ]B , t′ib, xi〉 ⇓ ([v]ia, [v]ib) i = 1, 2
Fyoram(write, [v]1a, [v]1b, [v]2a, [v]2b)
〈[M ]A, i, ta〉, 〈[M ]B , i, tb〉 〈[M ]A, ε, ε〉, 〈[M ]B , ε, ε〉 : ε
H-Cond-While
i = O : if(x) or i = O : while(x) ta = tb = x
〈[M ]A, i, ta〉, 〈[M ]B , i, tb〉 〈[M ]A, ε, ε〉, 〈[M ]B , ε, ε〉 : ε
H-Declass
i = O : declass(x, y) ta = tb = y
v = FΓ(x)declass([M ]A(y), [M ]B(y))
D = select(Γ(x), (x, v), (x, v))
〈[M ]A, i, ta〉, 〈[M ]B , i, tb〉 〈[M ]A, ε, ε〉, 〈[M ]B , ε, ε〉 : D
H-Seq



















〈[M ]A, ia, ta〉, 〈[M ]B , ib, tb〉 〈[M ′]A, i′′a, t′′a〉, 〈[M ′]B , i′′b , t′′b 〉 : D
H-Concat
〈[M ]A, ia, ta〉, 〈[M ]B , ib, tb〉 〈[M ′]A, i′a, t′a〉, 〈[M ′]B , i′b, t′b〉 : ε
〈[M ′]A, i′a, t′a〉, 〈[M ′]B , i′b, t′b〉 〈[M ′′]A, i′′a, t′′a〉, 〈[M ′′]B , i′′b , t′′b 〉 : D
〈[M ]A, ia, ta〉, 〈[M ]B , ib, tb〉 〈[M ′′]A, i′′a, t′′a〉, 〈[M ′′]B , i′′b , t′′b 〉 : D
H-LocalA
(i, t)→ ia = i@i′a ta = t@t′a
〈[M ]A, ia, ta〉, 〈[M ]B , ib, tb〉 〈[M ]A, i′a, t′a〉, 〈[M ]B , ib, tb〉 : ε
H-LocalB
(i, t)→ ib = i@i′b tb = t@t′b
〈[M ]A, ia, ta〉, 〈[M ]B , ib, tb〉 〈[M ]A, ia, ta〉, 〈[M ]B , i′b, t′b〉 : ε
Fig. 19: Hybrid Protocol ΠG(PartII)
Notice that [M ]〈t〉 is defined over only read(x, v), x, and
concatenations of them. This is because this notion is used for
binary operation and multiplex, where array read events and
write events do not occur. The rule SE-MUX for multiplex
operation is similar.
For array expression y[x], there are two rules, SE-ArrVar
and SE-L-ArrVar. If Γ(y) = O, then evaluating y[x] is an
ORAM read operation. Rule SE-ArrVar calls the ORAM func-
tionality Fyoram to get the secret shares ([v]a, [v]b). Otherwise,
y[x] can be computed locally, and rule SE-L-ArrVar handles
this case.
The second part of the rules (Figure 19) are for hybrid pro-
tocol, which are in the form of 〈[M ]A, ia, ta〉, 〈[M ]B , ib, tb〉 
〈[M ′]A, i′a, t′a〉, 〈[M ′]B , i′b, t′b〉 : D, meaning that Alice and
Bob keeping their shares of secret variables, i.e. [M ]A and
[M ]B respectively, execute over their simulated traces, i.e. ia
and ta for Alice, and ib and tb for Bob, evaluates to new







generate declassification D, which is either ε or (da, db).
Rule H-Assign deals with the instruction O : x := e. The





b) are the memory traces for Alice and Bob to
evaluate e. This rule first evaluates the expression e to get [v]a
and [v]b. Then it substitute the mapping for x in [M ]A and
[M ]B accordingly.
Rule H-ORAM handles ORAM initialization instruction
O : init(x, y). Either of Alice’s or Bob’s memory trace must be
readarr(y, 0,m(0))@...@readarr(y, l,m(l))@x, where l =
|m| − 1. From this trace, one party is able to reconstruct the
memory m, which is later fed into ORAM functionality Fxoram
to initialize it.
Rule H-ArrAss handles the instruction O : y[x1] := x2.
First, the secret shares for evaluating xi are [v]ia and [v]ib
for i = 1, 2 respectively. Then they are fed into the ORAM
functionality Fyoram to perform a write operation.
Rule H-Cond-While handles O : if(x) and O : while(x),
which only consumes the corresponding memory traces x, and
does not modify [M ]A and [M ]B .
Rule H-Declass handles the instruction O : declass(x, y),
which is the only instruction generating non-empty de-
classification. According to rule S-Declass, both mem-
ory traces are y. It calls the declassification functionality
FΓ(x)declass([M ]A(y), [M ]B(y)) to release the value of v to the
party corresponding to Γ(x).
The rules discuss above handles only one instructions.
There is a proposition similar to Proposition 1 that holds
true for hybrid rules. We start by introducing the concept of
consistency of secret-sharing mapping with a memory:
Definition 7. Given a type environment G, we say a pair of
secret share mappings [M ]A and [M ]B is consistent with a
G-compatible memory M if and only if for all x such that
Γ(x) = O, M(x) = FPdeclass([M ]A(x), [M ]B(x)).
Now we are ready to present the proposition
Proposition 2. Assuming 〈M,P 〉 (ia,ta,ib,tb)−−−−−−−→ 〈M ′, P ′〉 : ε.
We use the notation s to denote one element of the set
{x := e, x[x] := x, if(x),while(x), init(x, y), declass(x, y)}.
If ia = ib = O : s, and [M ]A and [M ]B are
consistent with M , then 〈[M ]A, ia, ta〉, 〈[M ]B , ib, tb〉  
〈[M ′]A, i′a, t′a〉, 〈[M ′]B , i′b, t′b〉 : D, and [M ′]A and [M ′]B is
consistent with M ′.
The rest four rules deal with multiple instructions. H-Seq
and H-Concat are similar to S-Seq and S-Concat correspond-
ingly. H-LocalA and H-LocalB are used to execute local and
public instructions.
We first show the hybrid protocol πG generates the same
declassification events. This can be easily proved by induction
leveraging Proposition 2.
We then show that the hybrid protocol πG securely emu-
lates the ideal world functionality F (Theorem 3). We sup-
pose Alice is the semi-honest adversary, and Bob’s case is
symmetric. To show this, the adversary of πG can learn ia,
ta, a sequence of secret share mappings [M ]A, [M ′]A, ..., and
declassification events D1A, D
2
A, .... In the ideal world, and
adversary can learn all the declassification events D1A, ..., and
it can simulate to get ia and ta. Further the secret share map-
pings [M ]A, [M ′]A, ... are indistinguishable to random bits.
Therefore, the adversary in real world can securely simulates
the hybrid world’s adversary.
